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Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?
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Friday, June 27, 1997
The Editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review are pleased to
publish this panel discussion held at the Fourth Circuit's Sixty-Seventh
Judicial Conference. The Washington and Lee University School of
Law has always enjoyed a close relationship with the Fourth Circuit.
Many notable W&L alumni have served in the Fourth Circuit, including
Judge Hoffman, to whom we dedicate this issue, and Justice Powell,
who sat in senior status with the Fourth Circuitfor many years after his
retirement from the Supreme Court. For twenty-five years, the Law
Review published an annual review of cases from the Circuit and will
soon publish biographical profiles of the Fourth Circuit judges from
the last fifty years. Last fall, a Fourth Circuit panel held oral argu-
ments in the Moot Court Room at the Washington and Lee University
Law School- among the few times the Circuit has held oral arguments
at a law school. The EditorialBoard is honored that the Fourth Circuit
chose the Washington and Lee Law Review to publish its in-depth dis-
cussion of the Independent Counsel statute.
The Judicial Conference presented an interesting investigation into
the Independent Counsel statute, itsfaults andfaiings, andsuggestions
for changes. The discussion included an impressive panel of learned
judges, attorneys, and special prosecutors who have been intimately
involved in this process. The Editors would like to acknowledge the
invaluable assistance of the Honorable J Harvie Wilkinson III, Chief
Judge of the Fourth Circuit, and the Honorable T.S. Ellis, III, Judge,
Eastern District of Virginia. To preserve the open nature of the pro-
ceedings, the Law Review presents the text in its raw format, although
the participants did have an opportunity to review and make minor
changes to their language. The Editors andparticipants have indicated
source references where appropriate.
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Foreword
Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III
The Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has a long
tradition. Chief Judge John J. Parker convened the first circuit-wide judicial
conference in Asheville, North Carolina, in 1931. The conference has flourished
throughout the years. The sixty-seventh annual gathering of bench and bar took
place at the Homestead in Hot Springs, Virginia, on June 26-28, 1997. Like
all of its predecessors, the conference was an agreeable and convivial occasion.
The circuit conference, however, has always had a more serious aim than
mere sociability. The statutory purpose of such gatherings is to review "the
business of the courts" and to consider improvements in "the administration
ofjustice."' For most of the year, judges and lawyers are properly attentive
to their individual cases and clients. The conference is one occasion when we
can step back and survey the broader landscape.
The independent counsel statute2 is an ideal topic for ajudicial conference.
The statute is an intersection betweenthe strongest imperatives of the rule of
law and the most basic prerogatives of democracy. How we approach this statute
will have a lot to say about what kind of republic we will have. The statute
asks the most fundamental questions involving public responsibility. It chal-
lenges us to consider to what and to whom our highest officials are ultimately
accountable.
In recognition of that fact, we have drawn our panelists for this program
from a wide variety of backgrounds. Represented on the panels are Justice
Department officials, judges of the Special Panel for the Appointment of
Independent Counsel, former special prosecutors, the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, congressional investigators, and other experts in the
independent counsel process. The panelists on our program represent different
and divergent points ofview. What they have in common, however, is an inti-
mate acquaintance with how the independent counsel process works.
The ensuing dialogue follows that process from start to finish. It begins
with an examination of requests for an independent counsel from the Department
ofJustice. It then discusses the appointment of independent counsel, prosecu-
torial investigations and decisions, and congressional investigations that parallel
the prosecutors' work. The program then concludes with a discussion of whether
the statute should be retained or how it may be improved in the future.
Inasmuch as the statute involves the potential prosecution of the top public
officials of ourcountry, any discussion of its operation is bound to be politically
charged. That is all the more reason for a program such as this one. We have
1. 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1994).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
1519
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1515 (1997)
asked the panelists to separate their judgments from the political temptations
of the moment and to ask what is ultimately the only question worth asking:
whether and how the institution of independent counsels serves the public
interest and the ultimate well-being of this republic.
Honorable T.S. Ellis, III
Few topics in recent memory have been as widely discussed in the media
as the activities of the independent counsel and the operation of the independent
counsel statute. Yet it is also true that most members of the public, including
many lawyers, do not know the statute's history, the details of how it operates,
orthe results of its use. In recognition ofthis, the conference committee respon-
sible for planning the program decided to distribute to conference members
a "fact sheet" setting forth some of this information for those members who
might not be fully familiar with the statute. The intricacies of the statute are
summarized below.
The statute is a relative newcomer to the political-legal landscape in this
country. For almost two centuries there was no established institutional means
for investigating and prosecuting senior-level officials in the Executive Branch.
Instead, such investigations were carried out either by the Department of Justice,
the Attorney General, or in some exceptional circumstances, by other ad hoc
means.3 The enactment of the independent counsel statute in 1978 changed
3. As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
"Itihe need for a special counsel who is to some extent independent of the Justice Department
and free of the conflicts of interest that exist when an administration investigates the alleged
wrongdoing of its own high officials has been demonstrated several times this century." In re
Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
For instance, in 1875, President Grant's personal secretary was implicated in the Whiskey
Ring scandal, which involved a group of moonshiners bypassing the revenue laws through
bribery. See Robert G. Solloway, Note, The Institutionalized Wolf An Analysis ofthe Uncon-
stitutionality of the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
21 IND. L. REV. 955, 958 (1988). President Grant fired the Federal District Attorney investi-
gating the crime and appointed a "special prosecutor" to complete the prosecution. Id
A more familiar example was the Teapot Dome scandal, which involved the Secretary of
Interior taking bribes in connection with the lease of government oil reserves. See Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., The Case for the Independent Counsel, 19 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 5, 31 n.6 (1994);
James B. Doyle, Note, "Who Will Watch the Watcher?": UsingIndependent Counsel to Compel
Federal Facilities to Comply with Federal Environmental Laws, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 671, 699
n.169 (1992). Although a subsequent congressional investigation revealed the Secretary's
wrongdoing, the Department of Justice refused to conduct a full-fledged investigation. Rodino,
supra, at 31 n.6. In response, President Coolidge appointed Harlan Fiske Stone as Attorney
General, "with special instructions to clean up the Department." Id.
A final, somewhat prophetic example occurred during the 1950s, when the Truman
administration was plagued with allegations that both the Department of Justice and the Bureau
1520
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this, institutionalizing in our law for the first time the circumstances and mecha-
nism for appointing independent counsels and for conducting investigations
and prosecutions of high-ranking, executive-branch officials.
The triggering event forthe enactment of the statute, of course, was the so-
called SaturdayNightMassacre. 4 Following that fateful event, many lawmakers
became convinced that legislation was needed to deal with the special and thorny
problem of investigating and prosecuting criminal wrongdoing of high-ranking,
executive-branch officials. Ultimately, this sentiment led to the statute in
existence today. Originally enacted as Title IV of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978' and subject to a five-year sunset provision, the statute has been
of Internal Revenue (the predecessor to the IRS) were corrupt. President Truman first directed
Attorney General McGrath, and then Newbold Morris, an outside "Special Assistant to the At-
torney General," to investigate the allegations. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Shared Power Under
the Constitution: The Independent Counsel, 65 N.C. L. REv. 881, 886 (1987); Rodino, supra,
at 31 n.6. Morris publicly announced his own independence from the Executive Branch and
declared that he would even investigate the Attorney General. See Solloway, supra, at 958.
McGrath fired Morris when the latter inquired into the former's personal finances and official
files, and then President Truman fired McGrath. See Biden, supra at 886; Rodino, supra, at 31
n.6. Under President Eisenhower, the Department of Justice ultimately secured several
convictions in this matter. See Biden, supra, at 886; Rodino, supra, at 31 n.6.
4. The circumstances comprising this infamous event of Saturday, October 20, 1973,
grew out ofthe now familiar investigation of the bungled Watergate burglary: Once the Water-
gate scandal reached full stride, Attorney General Elliot Richardson issued regulations that
created, within the Department of Justice, the Office of Watergate Special Prosecutor. The
eponymous position was held by ProfessorArchibald Cox, one ofthe program panelists. When
Professor Cox subpoenaed tapes and documents in PresidentNixon's possession, Nixon ordered
Richardson to fire Cox. (Cox was protected from removal unless there were "extraordinary
improprieties on his part." 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1973).) Richardson refused, choosing instead to
resign. Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, faced with the same directive from the
President, also relinquished his office. Next in line was Solicitor General Robert Bork, who,
as Acting Attorney General, fired Cox.
Three days later, Bork abolished the new office Richardson had created and ordered that
the Watergate investigation be conducted out of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division.
In the face of growing public concern, Nixon authorized Bork to appoint a new Special Prose-
cutor. Bork tapped Leon Jaworski, Cox's former assistant At Jaworski's insistence, Bork also
issued regulations reestablishing the office that Richardson had created, and that Bork had
abolished, only weeks before. For a general discussion of the Saturday Night Massacre, see In
re Olson, 818 F.2d at 41-42; Carl Levin, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter ofPublic
Confidence and ConstitutionalBalance, 16 HOFsTRA L. Rav. 11, 11-13 (1987); Rodino, supra
note 3, at 10; Alton L. Lightsey, Note, Constitutional Law: The Independent Counsel and the
Supreme Court's Separation ofPowers Jurisprudence, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 563, 566-67 (1988);
Solloway, supra note 3, at 958. Moreover, the regulations provided that the Special Prosecutor
would not be removed unless the President first consulted with the majority and minority
leaders of both Houses, and the chairmen and ranking members of the two Judiciary Com-
mittees. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30,738-39 (1973).
5. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
independent counsel statute in the face of separation-of-powers challenges in 1988. See
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reauthorized by Congress three times since.6
By its terms, the statute covers the President, the Vice President, Cabinet
officers, top officials in the White House and Justice Department, senior officers
in presidential campaigns, and any persons investigation of whom might present
a conflict of interest for the Department ofJustice.7 When the Attorney General
receives information that any one ofthese persons may have engaged in criminal
conduct other than a petty offense, she must reviewthat information to determine
whether it constitutes "grounds to investigate."8 If the Attorney General finds
that the information is specific and from a credible source, or if she is unable
to reach a decision on these matters within thirty days of receiving the informa-
tion, she must initiate a "preliminary investigation."9 This investigation must
be completed within ninety days, with a single sixty-day extension available. 10
Upon completing the investigation, the Attorney General must file a report
with the Independent Counsel Division of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, in which she either declines or requests appointment of
an independent counsel." This Division- a special court, really- consists of
three Article III judges appointed for two-year terms by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. One ofthesejudges must be from the District ofColumbia
Circuit. 2 If counsel is requested, the Independent Counsel Division appoints
the independent counsel and defines the counsel's prosecutorialjurisdiction. 3
The counsel, in turn, has "full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of
Justice," including conducting grand jury investigations, granting immunity
to witnesses, inspecting tax returns, and receiving appropriate national security
clearances. 4
The independent counsel has no specifiedterm of appointment, but instead
serves until the duties defined by thejurisdiction granted have been fulfilled. 5
Prior to such termination, only the Attorney General may remove the inde-
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
6. The current statute will expire June 30, 1999, unless reauthorized. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 599.
7. See id. § 591(b)-(c).
8. See id. § 591(d)(1).
9. See id. § 591(d)(2).
10. See id. § 592 (a)(1), (a)(3).
11. See id. § 592 (c). The Attorney General's decision in this respect is unreviewable in
any court
12. See id. § 49. Since its inception, ten judges have served on the three-judge panel.
13. See id. § 592(c)-(d).
14. See id. § 594(a).
15. See id. § 596(b).
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pendent counsel from office, and she may do so only for cause or mental or
physical impairment. Such removal may be appealed to the District Court for
the District of Columbia.
16
Since enactment of the statute in 1978, independent counsels have been
appointed to investigate, inter alia, allegations of drug use, perjury, bribery,
conflicts of interest, financial improprieties, lying during an FBI background
check, and abuse of executive power. To date there have been at least eighteen
independent counsels appointed, some of whose investigations are still pending.
These independent counsel investigations have cost the United States almost
$115 million. The table below sets forth more specific information regarding
these various investigations.
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS: 1978-PRESENT
17
Independent Counsel Subject(s) . Result(s) Cost
Arthur H. Christy (1979) Hamilton Jordan No Charges S182,000
Gerard J. Gallinghouse (1980) Timothy Kraft No Charges S3,300
Leon Silverman (1981) Raymond Donovan No Charges $326,000
Jacob A. Stein (1984) Edwin Meese II1 No Charges S312,000
Alexia Morrison (1986) Theodore B. Olson No Charges S2.1 million
Whitney N. Seymour, Jr. (1986) Michael K. Deaver 1 Guilty Plea $1.6 million
Lawrence E. Walsh (1986) Elliott Abrams 7 Guilty Pleas 547.4 million
Carl Channell 4 Convictions,
Alan Fiers 2 Overturned
Albert Hakim on Appeal










16. See id. § 596(a)(1), (a)(3).
17. Participants received a substantially similar table with their conference materials.
This updated table reflects the latest available data from the General Accounting Office Report
dated September 30, 1997. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL AUDIT:
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL EXPENDITURES FOR THE Six MONTHS ENDED MARCH 3 1,1997 (1997).
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Jnees~rne :. . .. esg: s Cost[: ..
James C. McKay (1987) Lyn Nofziger 1 Conviction, $2.8 million
Edwin Meese III Overturned on
Appeal
1 Acquittal
James R. Harper (1987) Confidential No Charges $50,000
Sealed (1989) Confidential Confidential $15,000
Arlin M. Adams (1990) Samuel Pierce 7 Guilty Pleas $27.1 million
Larry D. Thompson (1995) Deborah Dean 11 Convictions
Tom Demery 1 Acquittal













Sealed (1991) Confidential Confidential $93,000
Joseph diGenova (1992) Janet Mullins No Charges $3.2 million
Michael F. Zeldin (1996) Margaret Tutwiler
Robert B. Fiske, Jr. (1994) William Clinton et al. 3 Guilty Pleas $6.1 million










David M. Barrett (1995) Henry G. Cisneros et al. Ongoing $3.8 million
Daniel S. Pearson (1995) Ronald H. Brown Terminated 83.2 million
(subject deceased)
Sealed (1996) Confidential Confidential S48,784
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Program Introductory Remarks
CHIEF JUDGE WILKINSON: I welcome you to the Sixty-Seventh Annual
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, and I think we've got a great program for
you this morning.
The independent counsel statute, when we started planning this program
some eight or nine months ago, seemed an ideal one for a Judicial Conference,
and that was because the operation of this statute involved all segments of the
legal profession, members of the Executive Branch, members ofthejudiciary,
members of the House Judiciary Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee,
Congress and members of the private bar.
So there is no topic that takes in more different aspects of the legal pro-
fession than this one does.
I want to say a brief word about the organization of this morning's pro-
ceeding.
We are going to go forward in five segments. There will be five different
panels, and each of those panels will deal with a different phase of the inde-
pendent counsel process. The idea is to try to take you through the independent
counsel process from start to finish, from the very first time that a complaint
comes in and the question of whether to refer that to the special court for
appointment of counsel, all the way through the prosecutorial and investigative
process, and then finally we are going to take a look at the independent counsel
statute and what modifications or amendments, or whatever, should be done
in terms of the future.
I don't think we have ever had a finer group of people available to discuss
this problem. I have seen some discussions here and there on the independent
counsel statute, but never before have I seen a group of people with such a
breadth of viewpoints and such a range of experience as we have assembled
here this morning, and I want to thank the Program Chairman for his indefat-
igable efforts in trying to get the very best commentators in the country on this
question which has such a profound effect on our republic.
Tim Ellis has been absolutely dedicated intryingto puttogether a program
that would really get to the bottom of the hard questions dealing with the opera-
tion of this statute.
We want, in the final analysis, not only to examine the nuts and bolts of
this statute, the day-to-day operations of it, but to ask some pretty important
overall questions: Has the effect of the independent counsel statute upon Amer-
ican government been good or bad? Should we applaud this institution of the
independent counsel? Should we modify it or should we simply jettison it
altogether?
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Without further ado, I would like to ask Judge Bill Osteen from the Middle
District of North Carolina to bring up the first panel members and introduce
them to us.
Bill.
Panel One - Requests for Independent Counsel
JUDGE WILLIAM L. OSTEEN, SR. (U.S. District Judge, Middle District
of North Carolina): All right. Thank you.
Ladies and gentlemen of the Conference and guests:
From the time this program was first conceived, the universal acclamation
has been, "Wow, what a timely and interesting program we're going to have."
Our enthusiasm was heightened considerably after that when we found
out who the panelists were going to be. So we are delighted to have the panels
here for the five sections that we are going to have this morning.
Now, we could spend a lot of time introducing them-and they are properly
deserving of the accolades that they have accomplished throughout their span
of public service - but I think they have acceded willingly - and I know you
will accede willingly -to the fact that we would rather hear from these people
than to hear all of the accolades to which they are entitled. So for that reason,
we are going to dispense with the customary introduction of our guests, and
I would simply ask you to welcome, after I introduce both of them, first former
Attorney General William Barr, and secondly, former Deputy Attorney General
Jamie Gorelick.
Please welcome them here this morning.
(Applause.)
JUDGE OSTEEN: Our section of the panel deals with as you may guess,
the introductory section of the statute.
Many of you already know that Title 28 of the United States Code, Sections
591 through 599, provides the independent counsel authority, formerly known
as the special prosecutor section."8 It is a law that came into effect in 1978."'
It has been renewed from time to time since then and has a sunset provision
which I believe expires in about 1999.20
Our section deals with the preliminary portion, and so we will concentrate
first on Section 591 2 That section, in summary, provides that the Attorney
18. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
19. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867, 1867-75
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (stating that statute will expire five years after date of enactment
of Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994).
21. Id. § 591.
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General shall conduct an investigation to determine whether an investigation
is necessary for certain people who may have violated the federal law.' Those
people whose investigation is mandated, including the President, the Vice Presi-
dent, members of the Cabinet, certain other members of the presidential staff,
certain other members of the Attorney General's Office, and other people, such
as the CIA Director and Deputy, and a few other officials, are covered under
this section.'
The statute goes further to say that the Attorney General shall consider
the credibility and the specificity of the information that comes to the Attorney
General in making a determination of whether to proceed further. 4
There is another section that is more inclusive from the standpoint of
persons covered, but is not mandatory as Section 591(a) is.' Section 591(c)
provides thatthe Attorney General may conduct an investigation where it appears
that there may be a conflict of interest arising from financial, personal, or
political interests.26
Our panelists will discuss those matters.
I think there weretwo groups ortwo persons thatI left out ofthe mandatory
section. Those include people who are managers or heads of the Reelection
or Election Committees of presidential candidates.
I would like now to turn to our panelists and ask Ms. Gorelick if she would
sort of explain to us how these investigations begin, how many there are
generally, and give us the preliminaries, please.
MS. JAMIE S. GORELICK (Vice Chair, Fannie Mae Corporation, Wash-
ington, D.C.): Surely.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here to discuss this
important subject.
Let me try to set the scene a little bit and give you some numbers from
the period '87 to '92. I use that period (1) because I am not comfortable in
discussing any casesthatmay be open atthe moment orthatwere opened during
my tenure, and (2) because Senators Levin and Cohen putto the prior adminis-
tration the question of how many cases had been reviewed by the Justice
Department during that period and whatthe results were, so we have the history.
I don't think the pattern is significantly different in recent years.
Suffice it to say that dozens and dozens and dozens of allegations appear
at the Justice Department every year - assertions that an independent counsel
22. Id § 591(a).
23. Id. § 591(b).
24. Id. § 591(d)(1).
25. Id § 591(a).
26. Id. § 591(c)(1).
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inquiry is warranted. These may come in over the transom from citizens or
may be announced on the steps of the Capitol by members of Congress. And
so you have the full gamut of allegations.
Many people do not understand what the independent counsel law does
and does not do, so you get a very wide variety of allegations. This group of
allegations is reviewed by a special unit within the Public Integrity Section of
the Criminal Division, and this work keeps that group busy full-time, reviewing
these allegations to determine whether a preliminary inquiry is warranted.
As Judge Osteen said, there are requirements before even a preliminary
investigation is triggered. There must be specific and credible evidence as to
a covered person for the mandatory section of the Act requiring an independent
counsel to be triggered. In the period 1987 to 1992, there were specific and
credible allegations made as to eight people who were not covered- and those
were principally cases involving a person who was associated with a covered
person, such as a family member or a close business associate-who had done
something alleged to be wrong and it was alleged that the conduct reflected
in the same way on a covered person. On these eight allegations, initial inquiries
were undertaken and it was determined that they did not justify a referral.
Thirty-five preliminary inquiries were undertaken where it was determined that
the evidence was not sufficiently specific or credible to warrant a preliminary
investigation. In nine cases, there was specific and credible information as to
a covered person, but itwas determinedthatno referral was appropriate because
"no further investigation was warranted," which is the standard to get to the
next stage. In five cases, there were applications for an independent counsel.
So that just gives you a sense of the numbers.
In the past four years, we saw a similar pattern, probably with a greater
number of cases coming in over the transom, and a similar winnowing process.
The process involved is this: There is a thirty-day period for an initial
inquiry, that is, thirty days from the time in which the Public Integrity Section
gets the matter for a determination as to whether there should be a preliminary
investigation. And that is where, in my view, the teeth in the statute are: at
that stage, you need to determine whether there is specific and credible informa-
tion as to a covered person. Once you do that and you begin a preliminary
investigation, the standard for determining whether to go to the court and seek
the appointment of an independent counsel is whether further investigation is
warranted; and it is often difficult to conclude that no further investigation is
warranted. And so relatively few of the cases that go to preliminary inquiry
are turned back at that stage, and you can see that in the numbers that Ijust read.
During that preliminary inquiry stage, the Department cannot use the normal
tools that a prosecutor uses; that is, you cannot subpoena records; you cannot
use the grand jury process; you cannot summon someone to a grand jury; you
1528
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cannot give a witness immunity. And so you are very much limited in the kind
of investigation that you can undertake.
That's the scene.
JUDGE OSTEEN: All right. Thank you very much.
General Barr, would you please comment on what sort of standard you
thought was appropriate in determining whether there was any credible
information and if there was enough specificity to warrant going ahead.
MR. WILLIAM P. BARR (Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
GTE Corporation, Stamford, Connecticut): The standard for commencing a
preliminary investigation is very low. It is not evidence of a crime. It is
information sufficient to warrant an investigation as to whether a person has
violated the law; and once that is triggered, once you get that information, you
are basically locked into going to court for an independent counsel, unless you
can do a couple of things.
One, to avoid the preliminary investigation, as Jamie said, you have to say
you don't have any credible information or you don't have any specific
information; or the one most usually used, and is being used today, primarily
is, "It's not a covered person; we don't have any information as to a covered
person." And it is very hard to knock out an allegation on the grounds of lack
of credibility because 90 percent of these things come from the newspapers;
there are some facts set forth; congressmen then push it to get an independent
counsel named-either Congress, congressional committees writing the Attorney
General and producing more facts and submitting more documents. It is very
hard to do it on credibility grounds. About the only way you can do it on
credibility is when you get one of these letters in the mail, you know, with
writing crammed in, written by someone who says that the head of the CIA
requires them to wear a colander on their head to avoid getting rays, or
something like that. But otherwise, it is very hard to knock it out on the basis
of credibility and specificity. So you launch the preliminary investigation. And,
as Jamie said, the real problem in this statute - she didn't say this was a real
problem, but she said there are limitations on the Attorney General during this
investigative phase, and the Attorney General of the Justice Department cannot
compel testimony or production of documents, no subpoena power, can't use
a grand jury-those are the two principal impediments - can't grant immunity.
And if you can't do that during your preliminary investigation and then you
reach the end of the preliminary investigation phase, for the Attorney General
to stop the thing at that point, the Attorney General has to say that there are
no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted. The
Attorney General can't say, "I don't think further investigation is warranted,
exercising my discretion and my judgment here, because even if we found
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particular facts, I'm not going to prosecute this case" or "This is not really a
prosecutable case."
The standard is: No reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation
is warranted.
It is very hard to conceive of a case where you can make that call where
you haven't subpoenaed documents and you haven't brought witnesses before
the grand jury, you haven't compelled certain people to speak to you, especially
when a lot of these allegations have to do with lying-you know, "You misled
Congress," or what have you.
So basically it creates a situation, a dynamic, under which it is virtually
impossible, once information comes to you about a covered person, to prevent
the naming of an independent counsel because your hands are tied during the
investigation phase, you can't get all the facts, and ultimately you have to say,
"There is no basis for further investigation." That's the tension in the statute
that sort of creates the drive to name an independent counsel even on, you know,
stuffthat normally the Justice Departmentwouldn'tbe driving for a prosecution
on.
You know, if an Inspector General gets mad at the Cabinet secretary and
drops a dime on him for misuse of the vehicle, or something like that, you know,
that is notthe kind of thing that, in the ordinary course, you necessarily prosecute
somebody over for a federal felony. But the statute creates a dynamic where
you're going to name an independent counsel, hire people, and they're going
to be driving against that individual because he misused his government
automobile.
JUDGEOSTEEN: Whathappens generally ifthe preliminary investigation
cannot be terminated and finally must go on, but You begin to find that people
named who are not mentioned in this statute? Do you obtain the authority to
keep that in the department or does the whole ball of wax go with the one
independent agency?
MR. BARR: Well, I think the Attorney General has a lot of discretion as
to what to refer to the court and what to keep. I think, as a practical matter,
if it is part of one transaction, as long as you have a covered person in there,
you really can't refer a case as to one individual when you are dealing with a
group of subjects. So, usually the whole subject matter goes over to the inde-
pendent counsel.
MS. GORELICK: And if I might add a point there.
There recently was an instance in which an independent counsel sought
to pursue matters that the Justice Department thought were not related to his
original jurisdiction and the Justice Department opposed his application to the
Special Division for an extension of his authority to that matter which he
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considered to be related. In that case there was an exception to the general rule
that no independent counsel can be appointed without the Attorney General
seeking to give an independent counsel that case, because the Special Division
decided, over the objection of the Attorney General, to grant the IC that
jurisdiction.
So even the one fail-safe, which is that the Attorney General must be the
person seeking the appointment of an independent counsel, has been whittled
away some in the recent past.
MR. BARR: I would like to point out that there is an ambiguity - at least
I think there is a big ambiguity in the statute.
It is not really an ambiguity. It is, I think, a failure to address what they
really intended to do; and that is that technically the Attorney General doesn't
have to go forward if he determines that there is no basis for further investiga-
tion. So there is a situation where the Attorney General says, "You know, I
think I have all the facts here, and as the Justice Department, we would normally
not continue an investigation at this tinie so I'm not going to go to the court
for an independent counsel," and then actually rule on the case - essentially
exercise his discretion and say, "we wouldn't prosecute this case, so we're not
going to prosecute it, no grounds for further investigation."
The only time you have to go to the court is when there are grounds for
further investigation, and I don't think that's the purpose of the statute. I think
the purpose of the statute is to remove from the Attorney General those kinds
ofjudgments and calls and decisions as to the prosecutive merit of the case.
MS. GORELICK: There is one element here that I think is very significant,
which is that at the end of the Bush Administration the statute was changed
to prohibit an Attorney General from declining to investigate and declining to
refer on the basis of a lack of intent; that is, unless the Attorney General can
find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person had no intent to violate
the law, the Attorney General must seek an independent counsel.
Now, anybody who practices in the white-collar area knows that what
defines most crimes is intent. A failure to list an asset on a financial disclosure
form is not a crime unless it was done with willful intention of not disclosing
that asset, and yet that element of the offense is basically removed from the
Attorney General's discretion. And so you get even greater pressure than Bill
described in those cases where the only difference between a crime and an
infraction of some administrative sort is intent.
JUDGE OSTEEN: Go ahead. Do you have something?
MR. BARR: That is an area of great mischief, because I would say most
of these cases turn on intent and it sort of reverses the burden to say that the
Attorney General can't dispose of this unless he has clear and convincing evi-
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dence of that, because ultimately the prosecutor has to have proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; and what happens is, even though it is pretty clear that the
prosecutor will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the Attorney
General still has to goto an independent counsel, down the independent counsel
track, and the independent counsel's investigation really consists of, you know,
months or years of trying to dig up some ancillary evidence somewhere to
somehow prove a state of mind. I mean, you can pretty much say up front that
it is going to be something that is going to be difficult to prove.
JUDGE OSTEEN: Thank you.
Ms. Gorelick, wouldyou please tell us why section (a)27 is mandatory and
section (c)28 is discretionary in the preliminary investigation?
MS. GORELICK: You ought to ask Congress that question.
JUDGE OSTEEN: Did you find that a difficult line to make a determination
on whether you should, in your discretion, look at this or whether you are
mandated to look at it?
MS. GORELICK: Well, the mandatory sections are easier to interpret. I
think thatthediscretionary sections oughtto be used in only rare circumstances.
That is my-own personal view.
I thinkAttorney GeneralBarr could investigate almost anybody, with very,
very few exceptions, without having a so-called political conflict of interest.
Now, if he had a financial relationship with someone under investigation, that
is another story; but that is not what comes up. It is the so-called political
conflict.
I think that it undermines our system of justice to say that our primary
institution ofjustice, the Department of Justice, cannot find the wherewithal,
with all of those career prosecutors, with only a very thin overlay of political
appointees, to investigate most cases. And so I would, if I were Attorney
General, take a very, very narrow view of the discretionary power to seek an
independent counsel.
MR. BARR: I took a very narrow view of it, too, because I disapproved
of the statute in general and I wasn't going to invoke the statute unless I was
absolutely compelled by the law to invoke the statute. So I never used the
discretionary provision, but I do believe that there are quite a few cases that
don't necessarily involve covered people, or don't clearly involve covered
people, that should not be handled on a business-as-usual basis by the Justice
Department with people, in the bowels of the department, carrying out the
27. Ia § 591(a).
28. Id. § 591(c).
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investigation. I believe that high-level people of some stature with a little bit
of distance and independence should be assigned those cases, and take responsi-
bility forthose cases, ultimately underthe responsibility oftheAttorney General.
So what I did was I used my inherent authority as Attorney General when
these cases arose, and I brought people in from the outside. On the so-called
Inslaw Octopus Scandal, whatever that was all about, I brought in Judge Bua
from Illinois to take a look at; on the Iraqgate nonsense, I brought in Judge Lacey
from NewJerseyto take a look at; and on the House Bank, which didn't involve
executive branch people, but created a lot of political tension because people
who were involved in our oversight, and so forth, were involved, I asked Judge
Wilkey to take a look at that.
So I did that on my own nickel, not under the statute.
JUDGE OSTEEN: Thank you.
Now we are going to depart from our prescribed program and give each
one of our panelists a free shot in saying why they think the statute is good,
bad, or anything they wish to say. We are going to designate four minutes of
free time for each one.
Ms. Gorelick.
MS. GORELICK: Well, I will be very brief about this.
Number one, I think that the statute ought to be restricted in its coverage.
I don't think that there is any reason why Attorney General Reno couldn't
investigate Henry Cisneros. Ijust don't. There are lots of examples ofindepend-
ent counsel designations thatwe have had that I think were unnecessary. Ithink
it is overused - witness the number of calls now, on a routine basis, for
independent counsels - and I think it undermines our fundamental respect for
our institutions ofjustice. I do think that you need to have one, and the ability
to seek one, in the most extraordinary cases, and I would limit the statute to
the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, and maybe the Deputy
Attorney General, or the head of the FBI. You do have special issues when
there is credible evidence of a crime at the highest level of the Department of
Justice. But I would limit the scope of the Act considerably.
In the absence of that change, I would radically change the coverage with
respect to campaigns because you end up with people who are covered persons
who had, in fact, much less power and authority in the political process than
people who are not covered. It is really serendipitous, depending on who was
serving on what committee with what title, and that part of the statute does not
work at all.
Third, Ithink you need to have some standard with regard to the importance
of the underlying allegation. I haven't tried to articulate it - and I'm sure it
is harder to be specific than it is simply to state the idea - but the issues under
review by an independent counsel should be only those that are extraordinarily
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serious. I would limitthe use of an independent counsel to activities by someone
while in office and of a serious nature, but I think that there is room for debate
on the scope in this regard.
Fourth, I certainly would eliminate the reverse burden of proof for the
Attorney General on the issue of intent. There are a number of independent
counsel referrals that we did make which would not have been made in any
sensible world, simply because we could not adduce clear and convincing
evidence that there was not intent to break the law. That should happen.
Fifth, Iwould change the process by which an independent counsel creates
authority under the "related matter" heading. Ifyou have information that might
implicate Mr. Barr, who might implicate Judge Walsh, who mightthen implicate
the subject of an independent counsel's inquiry, under the case law, as it has
developed on the issue of"related," I, as an independent counsel, would have
jurisdiction to investigate, even though I would be looking at you, who is not
a covered person, for something that has absolutely nothing to do with the
original grant of jurisdiction.
Now, anybody who has been a prosecutor knows that you have to have
some ability to deal with people who are potential witnesses againstyour target,
but, in my personal view, there are no practical limitations on the jurisdiction
of an independent counsel who wants to take his investigation out beyond
secondary and tertiary witnesses to the "nth" degree. We have seen some of
that and we have seen some litigation over that. And I would certainly make
it very clear, if I were in Congress, that the Special Division has no authority
to grant related-matter jurisdiction withoutthe Attorney General having sought
that in the first instance.
JUDGE OSTEEN: Thank you very much.
General.
MR. BARR: Well, I have always been against the statute. I still am.
During the transition, Bernie Nusbaum came in and asked me for some
advice and I said, "We killed the independent counsel statute. Take my advice,
don't breathe new life into it. As a Republican, I'd love to see you live under
it, but as an American, I can tell you it would be bad news if you get that thing
going again."
He said, no, that they had a higher standard and they were going to
resuscitate the statute.
I agree, there are some quick fixes you can do on the scope, and other things
like that, but the problem - and Jamie was talking about this problem - you
really can't draw a line on the seriousness of the matter because ultimately
what you really are talking about are judgments, judgment, prosecutive merit
of the case, the exercise of discretion, and common sense. And what the statute
does is it takes it away from executive branch officials and an institution that
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is making those judgments every day, and has a track record of making those
judgments, and puts it outside and gives itto somebody else to make, someone
who I don't feel has enough accountability, someone who has too narrow a scope
and loses perspective as to where they are going and to drive against an
individual.
I think that's bad and I think it's unfair.
So my substitute for the statute is, if you accept the premise that the
Attorney General, you know, may cut someone a sweetheart deal and you can't
trust them to exercise discretion, then the answer to that is to have the court
put in somebody who is looking over the shoulder, writes a report, blows the
whistle, announces to the world that a non-bona fidejudgment has been made,
something that is not within the realm of proper prosecutive discretion, and
let the Justice Department explain its decisions and open up its decisions to
these individuals, but let the decision ultimately be made by the politically
accountable official.
You know, let's take the situation of- and obviously, this is suggested
by the situation of Vice President Gore -but suppose the Vice President of the
United States did make some fund-raising phone calls from the White House.
You know, call me a softy, but I don't think we should tie up the govern-
ment by prosecuting the Vice President of the United States for a federal crime
because he used the telephone in making a few fund-raising calls.
But under this is a statute, you know, you look for the technical federal
felony, you find it, bring in an independent counsel, turn all the fund-raising
of that party up on its ear because of those phone calls, looking for some
indication of what the intent was.
I mean, as Attorney General, I'd try to find out what the facts are, let the
political check operate in that case. Unless it was particularly contumacious
behavior, rather than stupidity or ignorance of the law, or what have you, I would
say I'm not going to prosecute the Vice President of the United States because
he made five phone calls to raise money from the White House- it's ridiculous.
It's not in the public interest - and let the Attorney General take the heat, if
there is heat, publicly for it - the political check - and let the administration
or the Vice President take the heat, if he did wrong.
Butthis criminalizing of every bit of conduct by executive branch officials
is a political weapon. These things come in during election years; they're
brought by political opponents: it's a political device, and it's wrong. And
I say we can have more reliance on the political check thanjust removing these
important judgmental issues from the people who should be making them.
JUDGE OSTEEN: I know you want to join me in thanking our panel.
(Applause.)
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Panel Two -Appointment of Independent Counsel
CHIEF JUDGE WILKINSON: The next phase of our discussion of this
statute deals with the appointment process of the independent counsel and the
court that does that, and I would like to ask Judge Cameron Currie from the
District of South Carolina to bring Judge Sentelle and Judge Butzner to tell us
about how the court goes about appointing independent counsel.
JUDGE CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE (U.S. District Judge, District
of South Carolina): Thank you, Chief Judge Wilkinson, and good morning,
everyone.
I knew that we had a timely subject here when, in the recent New Yorker,
the cartoon shows the waiter arriving at the table with his tray and a man sitting
on the tray and says, "Who ordered the special prosecutor?"
We are going to talk now about who does order the special prosecutor,
and the panel members who are with me here today were not selected by anyone
who had anything to do with this program, but rather by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court pursuant to federal law.
These two gentlemen are two of three members of the Special Division
oftheUnited States Court of Appeals forthe District of Columbia Circuit, which
is the court established under Title 2829 to go with, or go along with, the act
and provide a mechanism for appointment of the special counsel. °
To my left is Judge David Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit; to my right is Judge
John Butzner of the Fourth Circuit.
Together, these gentlemen have agreat institutional memory. Judge Butzner
has been a member of this special division for a number of years and he is, as
Judge Sentelle referred to it, the institutional memory of the court, and Judge
Sentelle is now in his third two-year term on this court.
The third member of this court is Judge Peter Fay of the Eleventh Circuit
in Miami.
The way in which this works is that the independent counsel statute
established the court and said that the court shall appoint appropriate indep end-
ent counsel and shall define that counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction.
So we have the appointment authority; we have the defining authority in
terms ofjurisdiction; and, as I have learned in studying this statute, there is also
quite a bit of other work that goes along with being a member of this court.
So these gentlemen spend a great deal of time working on matters that have
to do with the independent counsel statute and, as I said, they are appointed
for two-year terms.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1994).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1994).
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The statute requires that priority in selection be given to senior circuit
judges and retired justices, and the statute also specifically requires that one
member of the panel be a member of the D.C. Circuit.
The Clerk of this court is the Clerk of the D.C. Circuit and, as Judge
Sentelle has indicated, he gets one additional staffimemberto assist inthe work
of this court.
Now, the first and most interesting part of theirjob is the appointment of
the independent counsel, and so we will go first to that.
Assume for a moment that there has been an application filed by the
Attorney General for appointment of counsel. Judge Sentelle, can you tell us
what that does as far as your court? What do you have to do at that point?
JUDGE DAVID B. SENTELLE (U.S. Circuit Judge, District of Columbia
Circuit Court ofAppeals): We, of course, first have to review the application.
If it appears to be in order in terms of the statute - and they always have been -
it becomes our duty to select and appoint an individual to conduct the
investigation.
Do you want me to go into where we get the person from now or -
JUDGE CURRIE: That's fine.
JUDGE SENTELLE: We maintain a talent book, but it is, by no means,
exclusive, that contains the names and brief biographies of a large number of
attorneys around the country whom we consider as possibilities for independent
counsel. Those names can come to us from anywhere - first, from Judge
Butzner's institutional memory or our own official institutional memory where
we've accumulated names in prior instances. We don't throw them away. We
keep them in the book for the next time.
I had an extensive white-collar crime background, not doing it but defending
it. My former affiliation with the ABA was in the Criminal Law Section,
White-Collar Committee, and my American Inns of Court is the White-Collar
Inn, and so I know most of the practitioners nationally in that field.
So my memory, John's contacts in the judiciary, and at Judge Butzner's
suggestion, we obtain from the Administrative Office of the Courts the names
of the most recent resigned judges in the last several years. We also just get
suggestions from attorneys and judges who just call us or mail us the names
of people who they think would be good. We keep virtually all of them and
we review that talent book, winnow it down to a short list, take off anybody
who we see has obvious conflicts of any sort, and then we call them and see
if they're interested in meeting with us and interview and decide if they should
be an independent counsel.
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JUDGE CURRIE: Judge Butzner, Judge Sentelle mentioned conflicts. Is
there a problem in determining conflicts and have conflicts caused you to have
to continue to move down the list extensively to find independent counsel who
can accept the appointment?
JUDGE JOHN D. BUTZNER, JR (Senior U.S. Circuit Judge, Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals): Oh, yes. The conflicts arise not because of any nefarious
action, but simply because a member of the applicant's law firm or the potential
appointee's law firm may represent a party that will have some effect in the
investigation. A good example of that was in HUD.
It seemed like every law firm in the country, from New York to Chicago,
to Miami, had some contact with HUD, and not necessarily in the area where
the investigation was leading but just some contact.
For instance, I remember one law firm had litigation over a garage inNew
York. The investigation had nothing to do with a garage in New York. But
we draw a strict line and since we don't know what's going to happen in these
investigations, we cut that applicant out and went on to somebody else.
Fortunately, we found a retired judge from the Third Circuit, Arlin Adams, who
recently retired. He was an outstanding lawyer, a man of great integrity, whom
we knew personally, and fortunately his law firm - after he retired, he joined
his old firm - had no contacts at all with HUD. He undertook the job of
independent counsel and did it very well.
That is the type of thing we run into.
Most of the Washington law firms have some kind of contact with the
various departments, and for that reason, we look around the country and hope
to get independent counsel who have no conflicts. But again I emphasize, these
are not conflicts in the sense that there is anything wrong about them, they're
just conflicts.
JUDGECURRIE: Judge Sentelle, we have a list in our materials ofa number
of individuals who have been appointed independent counsel, and I wonder
if you could comment on whether or not political affiliation is ever a factor in
the decision of the court in determining who should be appointed independent
counsel.
JUDGE SENTELLE: Obviously, in the first instance it is because the purpose
of the independent counsel statute- and I want to underline the "independent" -
is to find a special prosecutor or independent counsel who is free of connection
with the administration that is under investigation. So if you have someone
who is politically connected with the President or with the covered individual
who is the subject of the investigation, that person doesn't have the kind of
independence contemplated by the statute and we wouldn't choose that person.
Beyond that, political affiliation per se is not really a consideration; it exists.
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Nearly everybody who is qualified to be independent counsel has some
kind of political involvement in their background. Ifthere was someone directly
connected in some way with the person under investigation, then we wouldn't
have the independence. But beyond that, I think - I've seen Professor Cox in
the front row there-I think of the Archibald Cox mode of what is a really good
special prosecutor or independent counsel. A person who was, for example,
Solicitor General in the administration before the one under investigation, as
Archibald Cox was, who was perhaps active inthe other party than the one under
investigation, as he was, really is an ideal independent counsel because they
underline the integrity of the investigation, that they have no ax to grind to
defend any abuse of power that might exist. It puts the covered person in the
same position they would be if they had been in a prior administration and the
present Justice Department was investigating them.
So I guess, to that extent, you would say we know about the political
affiliations, but beyond the obvious ones where they lack independence, we
don't make it a part of our sine qua non at that point.
JUDGE BUTZNER: Let me add to that. Certainly when we get to the point
of interviewing aperson orpeople thatwe think would be independent counsel,
we ask very pointed questions and expect very honest answers about
contributions to a party- either party- and how much were those contributions
and to whom did they go.
Now, many, many lawyers make contributions at a local level to their
congressman. But some lawyers make contributions to both candidates, and
we have to ask, "How much was it?" and if it was a large amount, why, we would
rather have someone who wasn't that much interested in the election of that
congressman.
It is not exactly a conflict of interest. It is sort of a judgment call. If it
was not a large amount and we found out that that's generally what's going
on, we would not necessarily disqualify the person for making the contribution
to his congressman. But if the contribution was to the President orthe candidates
for President, I should say, either party, we generally - I should not only say
generally but invariably - we will not accept that person because, by the terms
of the statute, the investigation is going to be an investigation of the Executive
Department.
31
JUDGE CURRIE: Judge Sentelle, some commentators about the statute
have stated that the independent counsel should be a full-time position and other
commentators have suggested that perhaps there should be some sort of in-depth
investigation of the person appointed as independent counsel before they are
appointed.
31. Id. § 591(b).
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Do you have any comments to make on those suggestions?
JUDGE SENTELLE: I suppose two.
Judge Butzner and I and Judge Fay have discussed that question of full-time
independent counsel before, and while that model can exist, it would so greatly
limit the people that you could find who would be willing to undertake this that
we think could go on for years and years and years; and the attorneys who have
the ability, the reputation and the proven integrity for the job do not want to
give up years of their career that they have spent their lifetime up to now
establishing -to take years of it out in orderto do something thatwill be lower
paying, unpopular, and may not lead to anywhere.
So the idea of requiring full time is something that, while it might not make
our job impossible, would make our job very nearly impossible. Maybe a
full-time staff could be found by the independent counsel particularly by
detailing from Justice or from the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, but as far as the
independent counsel himself, I don't think it can be done as a practical matter.
JUDGE BUTZNER: Let me add to that that the independent counsel is paid
according to level 4 of the Executive schedule.32 He is paid on an hourly basis,
and that amounts to $55.43 an hour, with a maximum of$115,682. So you can
see that we would find it very, very difficult for someone who has a good law
practice. That is the reason we have tried to get, and have gotten in some
instances, retired judges- not seniorjudges; we can't touch them -but retired
judges who can devote a great deal of their time because of the pension.
JUDGE SENTELLE: Even with that model, we have to find those who are
not planning to spend the next several years doing a lot of particular kinds of
practice because they are going to have to give it up, if they were to come full
time. So itjustmay notwork, ifthat were arequirement, of full time. We might
find such a person in a given case; we might not.
The second part of your question was about the background.
What we do now - and some people might say it's not enough - but what
we do now is, we contact the FBI. We have them send us what background
they have already on the person we have under consideration. These people
are usually public figures, with well-established reputations. Without exception,
the FBI has investigated them for something in the past-they've been appointed
or nominated-I don't mean they've investigated them as subjects of criminal-
but they've been appointed or nominated or otherwise have been cleared by
theFBI. So although we do not have it updated by an independent investigation,
we have the benefit of often classified information that exists from the FBI.
32. Id. § 594(b)(1).
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It may be that Justice should furnish us with an FBI agent to do a full
background. I would have no objection to doing that, to get a more current
background, but it has not really proven to be a problem in the past. It could
in the future, and maybe if somebody wants to change the law to that effect -
Judge Butzner and I have agreed that we're not going to make a suggestion
of how to change it. We follow the law however Congress gives it to us.
JUDGE BUTZNER: Yes. And we find a good deal of current information
from LEXIS-NEXIS -
JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes.
JUDGE BUTZNER: - to supplement what the FBI has.
JUDGE CURRIE: The second part of the independent counsel division's
work is defining the scope of jurisdiction of the independent counsel.
Judge Sentelle, could you comment on what that involves for the court?
JUDGE SENTELLE: Very little.
The Attorney General sends us a request which has within the request a
requested scope. Ifwe reviewthat and it's legal- and it always has been-that's
what we - we might change a word here and there.
Now, Ms. Gorelick referred to the fact that we did, in a recent case, grant,
according to the words of the statute, when the application was made to us, an
extension which looked to us like a clarification to cover a related matter. That
was a very tiny modification of the original.
We had the statute before us; we reviewed it; we reviewed Justice's
arguments and decided that the statute said "related matter"; it said we could
do it. If the statute meant anything, it had to mean we could do that part.
Beyond that, I don't think we have ever done anything in defining the scope
of an independent counsel's work that did not come from Justice. Ithinkmaybe
in one instance we cut back on what Justice had asked for, but most of the time
our job in defining scope is very, very little. Wejust have our secretaries lift
out of Justice's document the part that defines scope and plug it into our
document in most instances.
JUDGE CURRIE: Once the independent counsel has been appointed and
the order signed defining his scope, what does the court have to do as far as
the investigation?
JUDGE BUTZNER: Very little, and less than that.
The Supreme Court has made it very clear that we have no supervisory
control over an independent counsel, and the reason for that is the doctrine of
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Separation of Powers.3 The independent counsel is an officer of the Executive
Branch and the judiciary cannot tell the Executive Branch how to conduct its
business. The statute provides that the Attorney General may remove an
independent counsel for cause, but that hasn't ever been done - but it's there
and it could be used. The statute also provides thatthe appropriate committees
of Congress shall have oversight of the independent counsel, and that is done
up to a certain amount. 5
The independent counsel has to report financially what he is spending and
what he intends to spend in the next six months in broad categories3 Thatreport
goes to the Congress. We get a copy of that- it is a public document, I think-
and we have no way to say "You're spending too much; you're not spending
it on the right things."
We get complaints about independent counsel, and we have to explain that
we have no supervisory authority and we cannot, without violating the
Constitution, exercise supervisory authority, as the Supreme Court has held.
JUDGE SENTELLE: There are a few little administrative details that we
tend to such as if the independent counsel is using assets or personnel from his
own law firm, there are certain waivers that we have to approve to make sure
they are not running afoul of some conflict statutes. Under the last amendment
to the act, if the independent counsel or his personnel are drawing per diem
beyond certain dates, we have to annually review that and approve it or
disapprove it.37 We've always approved it.
As Judge Butzner said, we get copies of the financial reports, although
I am not at all sure why because we have no power to do anything with it except
look at it and put it in the files. Congress can act on it or maybe GSA. There
is nothing we can do about it.
We get motions from time to time - usually a request from the Attor-
ney General for an expansion of jurisdiction or a motion by the independent
counsel to expand. We have had one or two of those that came directly to us
from the IC.
Beyond that, during the course of the investigation, our role is just limited
to those administrative things. It is only when we get to the end and get to the
reporting phase thatwe get very busy and then inundated with work to do again.
33. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-85 (1988) (discussion application of
Separation of Powers doctrine to Special Division).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
35. Id. § 594(a)(1).
36. Id. § 594(h)(1)(A).
37. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat.
732, 733 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 594(b) (1994)).
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JUDGE CURRIE: One of the little known aspects of the work of the Special
Division involves attorneys' fees of targets and subjects.
Under the law, someone who is a target or a subject of an investigation
but who is not indicted is entitled to seek reimbursement of his attorneys' fees
incurred in connection with the investigation, and so the annotations to the
statute contain numerous cases of petitions for attorneys' fees.
Judge Butzner, do you spend a lot of time reviewing petitions for attorneys'
fees?
JUDGE BUTZNER: Yes, we do. We have to look and see whether they
were in fact a subject of the investigation."
Remember, by this time, the report of the independent counsel, which has
not yet been released to the public, is available to us and we can go through
that report and determine whether the person was a subject. Also, the person
who is applying for counsel fees usually has a very articulate lawyer who
understands the statute and points us to the fact, or presumed fact, that this
person was a subject. Then we have to see that the fees are reasonable and that
but for the Act, they would never have been incurred.
Every ruling we make on this is published. We have a firm rule that we
will not dispense any moneywithout making it public. Usually it is made public
by a per curiam opinion, which Judge Sentelle has always kindly prepared, and
it is published in West and available on the Internet.39 But we don't want to
spend any tax money privately.
We have requests to do that. We have motions, "Please don't make this
request for fees public," and we deny those motions.
JUDGE SENTELLE: One other thing- and these are hard questions about
whether a person is a subject and whether the "but for" standard is met as far
as they wouldn't have incurred these fees but for the Act- on those and on the
reasonableness, we are directed by statute to obtain the views of the Attorney
General, and in the amended statute, also the views ofthe independent counsel.
It used to be we sent it to the Attorney General and they often said, "We
don't know; we didn't have anything to do with this investigation."
So the amended statute says we must also serve the independent counsel
and get the IC's views on attorney fee requests before we -
JUDGE BUTZNER: And that means, long after the independent counsel
has filed his report, he's going to be busy.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(f) (stating that subjects of investigations may recover attorney's
fees).
39. See, e.g., In re North (Reagan Fee Application), 94 F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re
Mullins (Mullins Fee Application), 84 F.3d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re North (Cave Fee
Application), 57 F.3d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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JUDGE SENTELLE: And isn't on the payroll any more and may not get
reimbursed in any fashion for having to do a document for us that may take
considerable time.
JUDGE BUTZNER: Now, the way we handle the report -
Do you want to take that up now?
JUDGE CURRIE: I think some other panels are going to cover some of
that, but you're welcome to go ahead and -
JUDGE BUTZNER: Well, I will limit it to this.
We notify everybody who is listed in the report that they can go to the
Clerk's Office, or their attorney can go to the Clerk's Office, and will have
available to them that part of the report which pertains to them so that they can
see whatthe independent counsel has said about them.40 They couldn't function
without that.
In the end, we direetthe independent counsel to take all those applications
for fees and responses to the report- and then sometimes there is criticism of
the report - and to put it in an appendix and it is published in - not the
application for the fee. I misspoke there - but the criticism of what the report
says, and that is published in an appendix to the report when the report is
released.
So far, we have released all reports, but there are several cases in which
even the appointment of the independent counsel has not been released because
it appeared to the Attorney General and it appeared to us that it would not be
in the public interest to do it if this thing was -
Well, for example, a tax case, you look into it and it turns out to be a civil
case the Department of Justice would neverhave prosecuted. It's settled civilly.
There is no intent to evade the taxes. We usually try and get a good tax lawyer,
as independent counsel, and he looks into it.
JUDGE SENTELLE: Those remain sealed and you never hear about them
at all - not just the report but other things.
JUDGE BUTZNER: But I think, in the last eight or ten years, there have
only been two cases like that.
JUDGE CURRIE: The only silver lining in all of this for lawyers is that
the defense attorneys who defend the subjects and targets are not limited to $55
an hour and are obtaining what is called a reasonable attorney's fee in line with
the market in the area.41
40. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2).
41. See id § 593 (f) (allowing for subject of independent counsel investigation to receive
compensation for reasonable attorneys' fees if independent counsel does not bring indictment
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Thank you very much to our panel members.
(Applause.)
Panel Three - Prosecutorial Investigations and Decisions
CHIEF JUDGE WILKINSON: We next come to the prosecutorial stage of
this process, and I will ask Judge Ellis if he will please assemble his panel and
come up.
JUDGE T.S. ELLIS, III (U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of Virginia):
Good morning, members of the Conference and guests.
My name is Tim Ellis. I'm a district judge from the Eastern District of
Virginia, and it is my privilege this morning to preside over the panel that
focuses sharply on the conduct of the independent counsel investigation. And
for that purpose, we have assembled a panel of four very distinguished lawyers
who have served as independent counsel. These individuals are not distinguished
because they were appointed, but rather they were appointed because they are
distinguished by virtue of a long and exemplary period of service at the bar or
on the bench and, as you heard from Judge Sentelle and Judge Butzner, their
sterling reputations for unshakable integrity.
Let me introduce them to you now.
On my far right, your far left, is Robert Fiske, a litigation partner in the
firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell, and he was appointed in March of 1976, by
President Gerald Ford, as United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, and he has also served in other distinguished posts, but he was a
United States Attorney, which I think is an interesting and important previous
experience for an independent counsel. He will have, I think, an interesting
perspective, as we will be asking the panel questions about the differences
between serving as an independent counsel and as a United States Attorney.
In January of 1994, Mr. Fiske was appointed by Attorney General Janet
Reno as independent counsel to conduct the Whitewater-Madison Guaranty
investigation.
On my far left, your far right, is Mr. Jacob Stein, a partner in his own law
firm in Washington, D.C., and those of us from the Washington, D.C. area are
well familiar with Mr. Stein as one of the deans of the D.C. Bar for a very long
time, young though he is.
In 1984, he was selected by the Special Division of the U.S. Court of
Appeals to serve as the independent counsel in the Edwin Meese matter.
against subject).
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Incidentally, in your materials, you should have received a handout that
summarizes some of the essential terms ofthe statute and some of the experience
under the statute.
Then on my immediate left, closest to me, is Larry Thompson, a partner
with the law firm of King & Spalding in Atlanta, Georgia. He was appointed
as independent counsel by the special panel of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, which you heard from previously, to investigate allegations
concerning the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
Then to my immediate right is Lawrence Walsh. Lawrence Walsh was
previously a U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York. He
also served as President of the New York and the American Bar Associations,
and he was appointed in 1986 and he served from 1986 to 1994 as the independ-
ent counsel to investigate the Iran-Contra matters.
So as you can see, we have assembled an absolutely magnificent panel
to discuss with us today the independent counsel investigation process.
Now, the question most frequently, insistently and, indeed, urgently asked
aboutthe independent counsel investigation is: What are the supervisory checks
that exist, or should exist, with respect to the independent counsel's authority?
And let me begin, in that regard, perhaps giving us some contrast with his
experience as a U.S. Attorney, with Mr. Fiske.
MR. ROBERT B. FISKE, JR. (Davis Polk & Wardwell, New York, New
York): I think the answer to that is pretty clear.
As United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, I was
part of the Department of Justice, headed, of course, by the Attorney General
in Washington, and there is a whole system of review procedures in place that
control what Assistant U.S. Attorneys or United States Attorneys can do in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. You can't take certain kinds
of investigative steps, like subpoenaing members ofthe media. You can't bring
certain kinds of cases, such as racketeering cases, without getting the approval
of career people in the Justice Department. And the whole purpose of that is
so that there can be a uniform, cohesive system of law enforcement throughout
the United States, with the centralized control in Washington, to make sure that
some Assistant or some U.S. Attorney isn't going off half-cocked in a way that
would be detrimental to law enforcement in general.
There are no such checks or balances in the case of the independent counsel
who, once appointed, has all of the authority of the Attorney General and the
independent counsel doesn'thaveto seek authority from anybody to do anything.
He or she can do whatever they feel is appropriate, without any review by
anyone.
JUDGE ELLIS: Isn't it true, though, that in the case ofMorrison v. Olson,
the Supreme Court concluded that the independent counsel clearly fell within
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the executive-branch side and that, therefore, counsel would be subject to
supervision?42
Indeed, the opinion is replete with references to the extent to which there
are supervisory powers.
Let me turn to Mr. Thompson and see if you agree that there is a difference
between the fact and the possibility - in other words, there isn't in fact any
supervision, but there could and should be?
MR. LARRY D. THOMPSON (King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia): Well,
I don't know, in reality, whether the difference in terms of the potential for
supervision that you have in a regular criminal case is any different than what
you have in an independent counsel situation.
I was United States Attorney at some time in my career in the past and
I have dealt with situations involving high-profile criminal investigations, and
what you really have now, I think - and it varies from administration to
administration- if you have a high-profile criminal investigation, you typically
have a very senior and very good Assistant United States Attorney on the case,
and in reality - and I understand what Bob said with respect to certain kinds
of charges, like RICO charges, and certain kinds of conspiracy charges that need
to have review in Washington - but in reality, you do not really have, from a
practical standpoint, very much supervision today; and I don't think, from a
practical standpoint, there is a real difference between the authority that an
independent counsel exercises and the authority that a regular criminal
prosecutor exercises in terms of supervision.
I would think, and I would submit to this audience, that the real authority
to control an abhorrent prosecution or investigation lies with the judiciary.
Article III judges have supervisory authority over grand juries. Lots of
times these motions are brought by good, competent defense counsel. You
certainly have supervisory authority over the conduct of an investigation after
indictment; and I think, with respect to the independent counsel, that it is no
different than any other prosecutor. Ultimately he or she is going to have to
prove the case in court, and that's where the authority should lie with respect
to a criminal investigation.
JUDGE ELLIS: All right.
Judge Walsh, do you agree that the ultimate repository of supervision is
in the Article III branch?
JUDGE LAWRENCE E. WALSH (Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma): It is, if the independent counsel strays beyond the assignment of
the appointing court.
42. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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There are two checks, really, on the independent counsel.
The first is the scope otfhis authority as defined by the appointing court.
Now, this is, as Judge Sentelle explained, usually the authority that the
Attorney General asks to have grantedto it. So the Attorney General is in there
at the beginning and there is no independent counsel ever appointed except at
the request of the Attorney General, and there is no review of the Attorney
General's decision. Ifhe or she decides notto appoint an independent counsel,
there is none.
Now, once she asks for his appointment, the court lines out his area of
jurisdiction.
As I say, there have been motions brought by defense counsel challenging
my activities as exceeding its defined scope.
The next check on independent counsel is the power ofthe Attorney General
to remove him for cause.
Now, cause is an elastic category, but if there is anything unprofessional,
unethical, or if he begins to stray from his activity, the Attorney General can
raise that by a removal proceeding which is, in turn, reviewed by the district
judge in the district in which the independent counsel is acting.43 So although
he seems to have an unsupervised way of going, he is conscious at all times
of the intense public supervision that he is receiving, and often the supervision
of a hostile administration.
MR. THOMPSON: Judge Ellis, -
JUDGE ELLIS: Yes.
MR. THOMPSON:-I would like to just point out, too, that the independent
counsel at all times is subject to the code of professional responsibility of his
or her state bar association, and many times those codes involve issues of
conduct for public prosecutors, and that is another area of control or check,
I think, on an independent counsel.
JUDGEELLIS: Well, are you suggesting that if an independent prosecutor
were to violate any of those provisions, that the state bar involved could then
take action?
MR. THOMPSON: Well, certainly could commence an investigation in
an appropriate situation, and I do know that that has happened with respect to
at least two independent counsel investigations.
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1994) (discussing grounds and process for removal of
independent counsel and procedure for review of removal decision).
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JUDGE ELLIS: Well, Mr. Stein, we have the Attorney General able to
remove for cause. And are there other checks or supervisory powers that you
think exist here?
MR. JACOB A. STEIN (Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, D.C.):
My experience is that I had unlimited authority as an independent counsel.
These ideas expressed by others concerning limitations wer6 not the way I saw
it. I had no limits. I was astonished at the authority I had, and I felt it was a
personal test of my own sanity in the exercise of that authority. I don't know
whether others thought that I passed the test. But I had more authority than
anybody should have. I was reviewing myself.
I think all of us who have had any experience with the statute believe the
number ofpersons who comewithinthe statute should be limitedto the highest
people in the government. The nature of the inquiry should be limited to things
done in office, misuse of the office. The independent counsel should be limited
so that he or she can't go into things that have nothing to do with the function
of the office.
Now, I was hoping at some time I would get an opportunity to read
something about investigations, and I am going to take that opportunity to do
so right now.
Excuse me for doing this.
JUDGE ELLIS: I now know why our chiefjudge assigned me this panel.
I think he said it would be something like throwing the rugby ball into the scrum:
one must get out of the way, and that's essentially what I will do.
All right, Mr. Stein.
MR. STEIN: "[T]he least thing is seen as the center of a network of
relationships that the [investigator] cannot restrain himself from following,
multiplying the details, so thathis descriptions and digressions become infinite.
Whatever the starting point, the matter in hand spreads out and out, encompass-
ing ever vaster horizons, and if it were permitted to go further and further in
every direction, it would end by embracing the entire universe."'
One other quote. This is from John Adams, a man of respectable authority.
"[G]uilt and crimes are so frequent in the world, that all of them cannot
be punished; and many times they happen in such a manner, that it is not of
much consequence to the public, whether they are punished or not."'
I tried to keep those two things in mind because it seemed to me that the
longer I was at large, the greater the danger that I, myself, would be investigated.
44. ITALOCALVINO, SIXMEMOSFORTHENEXTMILLENNIuM 107 (Patrick Creagh trans.,
1988).
45. John Adams, Argument for the Defense, in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHNADAMS 242,242
(L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
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I want to tell you about a personal experience I had in my investigation.
I was visited by someone from the FBI once a week - a very high person
in the FBI - and it was appropriate that he would visit me because he had lent
me four FBI agents to help me and the FBI agents reported to me only. He would
give me everything that the FBI collected over the week concerning Edwin
Meese, all sorts of material. He would hand this to me; and when I would look
at it, I would know that if any of this leaked, I would be under investigation.
So I didn't want it; I'd hand it back to him and say to him, "If it ever became
appropriate for me to have an article like this, you can be assured I will call
you." And he would say to me, "Well, you know, we can put a safe in your
office and you could put it in the safe," and I had had a little experience with
things like that, and I said, "No, you've got better safes than I've got; you keep
it in your office."
JUDGE ELLIS: I'm glad we didn't wait.
Mr. Fiske, you began this. Let me give you an opportunity to end it.
What kind of supervisory checks should exist?
And let me ask you also - I think omitted in the conversation that we've
had so far - is there any role for Congress? Does the statute specifically
contemplate such a role?
MR. FISKE: I don't think, once you have appointed an independent counsel,
you can have any checks beyond what I consider the extremely limited checks
that are currently in place.
Judge Walsh referred to the power of the Attorney General to remove an
independent counsel for cause.
It is not surprising that that has not happened to date. It is hard to imagine
politically how that could ever happen except in the absolutely most extreme
circumstances. I don't think that is a realistic check against what some of the
alleged abuses of conduct of independent counsel have been.
So I don't see a practical way to limit the authority of the independent
counsel and still say that the independent counsel is independent.
I would agree with others who have suggested that the statute should be
amended, and I would limit it to the very top people, as Jamie Gorelick said.
I think I would disagree a little bit with her view as to the limits on the scope
of the power of the independent counsel to pursue related matters.
When we get to that on the program, I will have more to say.
JUDGEELLIS: Should there be time limits, Mr. Thompson, on an investiga-
tion? In other words, when an independent counsel is appointed, should she
or he be given a time limit?
MR. THOMPSON: No, I think that is unrealistic.
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If you look at your handout, many of these cases - and whether or not it
should be an independent counsel case or whether it should have been handled
by the Department of Justice is really irrelevant once you get the case as a
professional prosecutor- and many of these cases did involve, and do involve,
criminal investigations.
What you have in criminal investigations are cover-ups; you have many
times active obstruction ofjustice issues.
It is very unrealistic to say that you need to complete an investigation within
a certain time.
I agree with Bob. I think we need to be very careful about placing limits
on investigating related matters because, in a criminal investigation, you need
to take the investigation where someone who might have information might
be with respect to the subject or target of the investigation.
So I think you need to be careful about placing artificial limits upon a
criminal investigation.
JUDGE ELLIS: I think all of you, however, would agree that the longer
that an independent prosecutor remains an independent prosecutor, the more
likely it is that he or she becomes politicized in one way or another; and,
therefore, while it may not be a good idea to have limits, Mr. Stein, I am sure,
would agree that self-imposed limits make sense.
MR. STEIN: I think so.
I think it was Oliver Wendell Holmes who said that the rule of relevance
is required as "a concession to the shortness of life." '46 And when the
investigation goes on so long that it is divorced from public interest, there is
a real problem.
I would like to know what the other panelists think about dealing with the
press.
Should you never deal with the press? Should you deal with the press?
When Iwas appointed, Judge Robb said to me, "Do you want some advice?"
I said, "I certainly do."
He said, "I don't want to see you on the Today Show."
I would like to get the feeling of others about that.
JUDGE ELLIS: That is a critical point, but let me give Judge Walsh one
last opportunity on the limits and resources.
Do you think, Judge Walsh, that there ought to be any limitations in terms
of time or in terms of funds or personnel imposed on an independent counsel?
JUDGE WALSH: I agree with Jacob Stein that self-imposed limits are
always desirable, certainly as a goal, because the longer you stay there, not only
46. Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (Mass. 1887).
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do you lose public support, but you also invite public attack or political attack.
So it is an inevitable thing and any independent counsel is going to be aware
of that. But as to trying to impose arbitrary limits, that is the way in which the
Iran-Contra congressional committee got into their basic trouble - and John
Nields will be here and maybe he can give you a different explanation - but
they imposed a six-month or seven-month limit on their investigation. It made
them sitting ducks for the administration, which was withholding information.
We were dealing not just with - first of all, there were no stumblebums
inthis business and we were dealingwith the most expert groups in our national
security community. We were dealing with our CIA, which is dam good and
which is composed, in some elements, of people well-trained in deceit because
that is their business-they do that for our country-and they also can turn those
skills loose on Congress and an investigating counsel, such things as giving
you a hundred thousand documents by holding out the ten that explain the other
ninety-nine thousand. It is beautifully done, and I could talk with you at some
length about that.
JUDGE ELLIS: Sounds like some ofthe people I litigated with for twenty
years.
JUDGE WALSH: That is the basic problem with trying to put time limits
on an independent counsel or on a congressional committee. You just put
yourself in the hands of defense counsel who can make motion after motion
and use up your time and you can't get -
MR. STEIN: Judge, could I ask you this.
On reflecting on the techniques that were used against you and the
resourcefulness of the people who were using them, as you look back on it, is
there anything that you would have done differently?
JUDGE WALSH: Yes, there is, Jake, because the limitation that Congress
put on its own investigation hit back at me. Because they had to finish in six
months and because they needed a storyteller like Ollie North to explain what
happened, I was confrontedwith the inevitability of their giving him immunity;
and in an effort to preserve the case against him, I had to get all of the evidence
against him in the files before he testified so that we could say that we had it
without listening to him. That didn't help in the end anyhow, as Judge Sentelle
may tell you. But that's what we did at the time.
Now, in an effort to get as much as I could as quickly as I could, I relied
on document requests.
The Attorney General before me, Attorney General Meese, had filed the
original document request, addressed to all the agencies, and I followed it along.
I expanded them to deal with my needs, but I took a chance on being able to
use them as the basis for getting the documents. I figured that ifwe subpoenaed
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them, we're going to get the same kind ofa runaround anyhow, but in that case,
we would have had a courtto go to to enforce the subpoena. That, inturn, would
have invited litigation which would have prolonged my work.
So I still think, though, to reply to Jake's question, I would have been better
to proceed by subpoena, fight it out at the beginning, than to rely on document
requests and then find out four or five years later that the Secretary of Defense
had notes that explained the whole business or a lot of these things and hadn't
produced them and had lied about them and we hadn't found it out.
JUDGE ELLIS: All right. Let's turn now to the interesting issue that Mr.
Stein raised about contacts with the press.
Mr. Thompson, did you have many contacts with the press?
I don't recall seeing you on "Good Morning, America."
MR. THOMPSON: No, and there is that opportunity to get on TV and talk
about the independent counsel statute and investigations in general or to talk
about your specific investigation, and I think it is improper as a prosecutor,
whether you are in an independent counsel's office or with the Department of
Justice, to talk about your case or investigation in the media. I just think that
that is something that you shouldn't do.
The only issue there is that many of these cases do involve highly politi-
cized, high-profile matters, and sometimes you do need to make a fair response
to defense counsel who is trying to improperly manipulate the media. So there
is a balance there. But I do not think that the prosecutor should initiate those
kinds of contacts.
JUDGE ELLIS: Mr. Fiske.
MR. FISKE: I tried to follow the same policy as independent counsel that
I had followed when I was United States Attorney, which was making no
comment to the press except when you announced an indictment or when there
was some court proceeding that resulted, as some of ours did, in guilty pleas.
Then, of course, it is perfectly appropriate to announce those. And, of course,
you do appear in court and respond to motions, and so forth, and all of that is
in the public arena and that is all duly reported. But I personally always believed
that a prosecutor should not be appearing in the press other than to announce
official actions of his or her office.
JUDGE ELLIS: Judge Walsh, what about contacts with the media? Did
you have many?
JUDGE WALSH: I did. I dealt with them on a fairly regular basis, for two
reasons.
One, I was under political attack from a very early stage and at times it
was necessary to respond to that and at other times, as my investigation dragged
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out over two years, three years, four years, five years, it was difficult, even for
good reporters, to keep everything with some degree of continuity. So in the
end, I would meet regularly.
There were a group oftwenty, twenty-five reporters following us with some
degree of regularity. They would have the option of coming to see me two or
three times a year. I would tell them how much money we spent. That was
in the public press at all times. We released our six-month figures to them as
they occurred.
"Why are you spending so much money?"
You try to explain in a general way, without dealing with the specifics of
any case.
Then, for example, after we had convicted North and Poindexter, the
question was: "Why are you still going? Why don't you go home?"
So then there would be a series of meetings in which we would explain
the framework of the investigation, again without identifying individuals or
talking about acase against individuals, and always bearing in mind, of course,
Rule 6(e), which forbids the disclosure of grand jury testimony.47 We gave them
no specifics, but gave them a generalized framework so that they would
understand an event of the moment.
And if you think, by not talking, you were going to minimize their attention
towhatwas going on, that's unrealistic becausetheywere monitoringthe grand
jury.
The D.C. Court changed it finally in the end, but all the reporters had to
do was stand at the elevators on the second floor and watch who went down
a particular corridor to the grand jury room and they would know who the
witnesses were today, and they were wise enough to understand the relationship
of those witnesses to a particular department or a particular line of inquiry.
But I thought that the regular meeting with them - and they were an
extremely decent, competent group - was helpful because it enabled them to
keep their stories accurate and to give the public some idea of the continuity
of the investigation.
JUDGE ELLIS: Mr. Stein, I take it that that varies a little from what you
did during your investigation.
MR. STEIN: I felt it was unwise to talk to the press for the reasons given
by two of the panelists.
JUDGE ELLIS: But when the investigation goes on some five to six years,
does that change it?
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
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And what about speeches to bar associations or speeches to other kinds
of groups? Did you do any of those?
MR. STEIN: Never.
JUDGE ELLIS: Judge Walsh.
JUDGE WALSH: I did it on two occasions: One, after the immunity was
granted to North, after North testified, not only - John Nields can explain all
this-butwhenNorth was called as awitness, his attorney, avery able attorney,
Brendan Sullivan, insisted that he only testify once, either in private or in public.
So it meant he had to be put on the stand publicly, with no preparation, without
knowing what he was going to say. And all of you who have ever questioned
a witness without knowing what he is going to say know what is very likely
to happen; and he ran away and a poll taken, at the conclusion of his testimony,
of the ten most popular people in the world had North as number five; President
Reagan was number four -
MR. STEIN: Moving up to one.
JUDGE WALSH: - President Reagan was number four and the Pope was
number six. So at that point I thought I had to explain why I was going to
prosecute him anyhow, and I did do that to the American Bar Association at
its meeting a month later. And another time, when the statute was under attack,
I spoke to the American Bar Association in defense of the concept of
independent counsel and the statute.
JUDGE ELLIS: All right. Mr. Fiske, did you want to end this round where
it began?
MR. FISKE: I think I started.
JUDGEELLIS: All right. Let's turn nowto the matter ofthe final report,
4
1
which is a matter of great interest to everyone. Let me ask whether there ought
to be, as there is, a requirement for a final report, for, after all, there is no such
requirement for a United States Attorney. When a United States Attorney
declines a prosecution, she or he doesn't get up in front of the press or publish
anything that says, "Well, I didn't prosecute, but I didn't prosecute because
of this, that, and the other thing, and it's one of those cases where it probably
should be prosecuted, but I don't have the resources."
What about the requirement for a report, Mr. Stein?
MR. STEIN: I think there are two elements.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) (requiring that independent counsel submit final report
after completion of duties).
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The public is entitled to know how its money is spent, and perhaps a report
should be written to give some information about that.
On the other hand, it can do a lot of damage to a lot of people. In addition,
writing the report requires a lot of time.
I was requested by two senators to put in my report that Mr. Meese should
be absolutely exonerated and from another senator that I should declare that
he is unfit for the job of Attorney General.
Well, I had nothing to do with those issues. My issue was whether there
was evidence to bring an indictment. Ifyou explore other issues, you yourself
become a political figure. That was not my assignment.
Anyway, if a report should be written - and there are many reasons why
there shouldn't be a report-perhaps itshouldbe confined to who you employed,
what their backgrounds were to show that you had quality people, and some
indication why the investigation took the time it did.
I also give advice to anybody who is going to be appointed an independent
counsel. Start writing your report as soon as you are assigned. If you wait to
the very end, you are going to have a tremendous problem.
JUDGE ELLIS: Mr. Thompson.
MR. THOMPSON: I agree. I owe a report to Judge Sentelle. It is a really
daunting task. I think it is a very wasteful requirement; there is a tremendous
potential for abuse.
When I was a prosecutor in the Department of Justice, when I ended a case,
I simply shut the door and turned the lights out. Now I have to spend millions
ofyour money doing this report. RightnowwhatI have to giveto Judge Sentelle
is a full and complete report.
The statute says that I need to write a report setting forth fully and
completely a description of the work of the independent counsel, including a
description of all cases brought.49
JUDGEELLIS: Does that include, for example, having to tell Judge Sentelle
and the other members of the court that while you thought there was evidence
of some wrongdoing, you didn't think you could persuade ajury, or something
of that sort?
In other words, what I heard you read and what I recall from the statute
clearly doesn't require that you, as you're turning out the lights, throw rocks.
MR. THOMPSON: Absolutely, and hopefully we will not do that, but you
will need to describe, as I understand the statute at this point, a basic degree
of the work of the office and the investigative work and some description of
the investigative details because I think now, as the statute is constructed, the
49. Id. § 594(h)(1)(B).
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court needs that, the special panel needs that, to determine the attorneys' fees
issue, especially who was the subject and the target of the investigation and
did not get prosecuted.
JUDGE ELLIS: All right. Judge Walsh.
JUDGE WALSH: I think the report is an important requirement of the
statute.
Where a person has the unsupervised power that we have all discussed
and in a matter of this kind of sensitivity, dealing with the highest officers in
government, he should be required to report on what he does.
The original idea of the statute was to create an independent investigator
whose credibility would be accepted in deciding not to go ahead against
someone.
The classic report that I always point to was the one by Leon Silverman,
who was later President of the American College of Trial Lawyers, who wrote
a thousand-page report on why Secretary of Labor Donovan should not be
prosecuted, and he pointed out the lack of credibility of the witnesses.
Now, I think itwas both important to Secretary Donovan and to the public
who had supported the investigation to know why, after the Attorney General
asked for an investigation, he concluded nothing should be done.
I think there are two questions.
One, should there be a report?
Second, should it be made public?
And again, this is a democracy where the public is entitled to know what
is going on and if somebody spends, like I did, $35,000,000, there is bound to
be some question and it ought to be answered by someone other than by political
opponents or people with an ax to grind, attacking either the statute or me.
There is another question also: whether that report should contain grand
jury evidence.
And I thought Judge Sentelle did a beautiful job of meeting that question.
First, the classified information was put in a separate report that nobody
saw except the court.
Second, he decided to leave the grand jury references in because they were
necessary to the complete story.
But before that reportwas released, he issued an opinion. President Reagan
had asked to suppress the report, and so had several others. He ruled on those
motions with an opinion which pointed out that all the report was was a report
by an individual. The conclusions expressed in it as to what the facts were and
why someone wasn't prosecuted were those of an individual. So his opinion
acted as a preface for the report to diminish it as a public accusation of any sort.
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And then finally the statute provides that every person mentioned in the
report is to have an opportunity to supply his comments, his explanations, his
denials, which are to be published at the same time as the report.
My report is three volumes. The third volume, which has the comments
by those mentioned in my report, is, by far, the longest. It is over a thousand
pages, in dealing with the 400- or 500-page report.
So I think it is a dilemma.
Is it right to have a prosecutor saying things that may be unfavorable to
an individual without having a grand jury indictment and a prosecution?
You know, we just shudder at that. But where you have to explain what
happened and why you didn't do something as the statute requires- and I think
it probably should require - why, it seems to me this is the best answer to it -
give everybody an immediate opportunity to answer - so the press gets both
the report and the answers at the same time and then have someone like Judge
Sentelle set the stage by diminishing the report as a public accusation.
JUDGE ELLIS: Mr. Thompson.
MR. THOMPSON: Judge Walsh, I understand your points there, but we
would not want that kind of report coming out of the United States Attorney's
Office or the Department of Justice. For example, ifJamie Gorelick undertook
an investigation of, say, a mayor of a large city and decided not to prosecute
him or her, we would think that the prosecution would be closed, and there
would be professional and ethical limitations upon her ability to write a report
as to what happened with respectto that investigation. And the question I have
is: I think that perhaps the filing of this report and the writing of the report
actually serve to not only make the investigation go longer, but perhaps serve
to overly politicize the investigation.
JUDGE ELLIS: Judge Walsh.
JUDGE WALSH: I could certainly say that it's a pain in the neck.
I worked for a year - the report took, I think, five or six months after we
were through.
Nobody likes the idea.
But just to meet Larry's point, the Attorney General has to file an annual
report. The structure there is in place. It is not something novel, like an individ-
ual independent counsel going off by himself.
Also, there is congressional oversight of the Department of Justice that
is regular. Although there is congressional oversight of the independent counsel,
it is very difficult to make that effective, and I think that to make congressional
oversight effective, they need a report. And if the report is going to go to
Congress, it certainly ought to go to the court, and I think Judge Sentelle was
right in releasing it to the public.
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JUDGE ELLIS: Mr. Fiske.
MR. FISKE: Larry contrasted this situation with that of the U.S. Attorney
or the career prosecutors in the Justice Department, and it really does make
the point very well, and it is sort ofa one hundred and eighty-degree difference.
The traditional U.S. Attorney investigation is one where they investigate
something. Hopefully the public, if it is done right, never even knows there
is an investigation at all; and if the decision, at the and, is notto prosecute, then
there is no prosecution, there is no announcement, and hopefully nobody ever
knew the person was under investigation.
The very situation that creates the need for an independent counsel is that
the allegation, which may be confidential or secret in the traditional investiga-
tion, is a public allegation. So the whole country knows about the allegation.
And, secondly, it is deemed that the Department of Justice is unable to
investigate that and, therefore, a person is picked from the outside to come in
as an independent counsel to investigate this highly publicized investigation.
It's easy if the person brings an indictment. Then we go through the
traditional system: Thejury votes up or down and he gets judged on the result.
The problem comes - or the theoretical problem comes - when the
independent counsel, who has been selected theoretically because of his or her
independence and credibility, decides not to prosecute; and then, even in a
nonpolitical politicized situation and certainly in the highly politicized situations
that have been common recently, everybody wants to know why not, and that
is what creates the demand for this report which is so otherwise antithetical
to our whole system.
It is interesting that originally the statute required the report to say why
the individual under investigationwas not indicted. The most recent amendment,
in fact, in 1994 makes that now discretionary so that that can be done or not
in the discretion of the independent counsel."
I think it is a very tough call -
JUDGE ELLIS: And how would you come out on that issue?
MR. FISKE: Well, I think you can't answer that yes or no. I think -
JUDGE ELLIS: It depends on - it's fact-specific -
MR. FISKE: I think you have to depend on the facts.
I think there has to be some explanation to the public why an indictment
wasn't brought. The problem comes when people say, "Well, we didn't indict,"
50. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108
Stat. 732, 734 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) (1994)) (eliminating requirement that
report contain reasons for not prosecuting matters within independent counsel's prosecutorial
jurisdiction).
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and then someone takes sort ofa gratuitous shot like the kind that someone tried
to get Jake Stein to take and say, "Well, we're not going to indict him, but I
think he's unfit for office" or "there are some ethical violations here," things
that go beyond the scope of the independent counsel's responsibility. That
shouldn't happen.
The last pointl wantto make-and I think this is an importantpoint-there
is an interrelationship, I believe, between a report requirement and the
complaints from so many parts of the media and the public about the length
and expense of the investigation.
We all have situations, when we're regular prosecutors, a case comes in
and an allegation comes in, you look at it, it doesn't seem to be going anywhere,
and you say, "Let's move on to something else; we've got other things we want
to spend our resources on."
The independent counsel has one case - one case. He is going to be
judged - he or she - on that one case, not on their overall track record. And
then when the results have to be laid out before the American people in a report,
it is understandable that a prosecutor is going to bend over backwards to run
down every last conceivable lead, dot every last "i," cross every "t," to make
that report as bulletproof as possible from the criticism that is inevitably going
to come out if there wasn't an indictment.
And so I think those two things are inextricably interrelated. As long as
you have that report requirement, you are going to have these long and expensive
investigations, because it all makes sense from the point of view of the person
that is doing it.
JUDGE ELLIS: I think those comments adequately deal with the report
issue.
Let me turn now to another very important, indeed sometimes incendiary,
issue and ask: What kinds of questions arise, as is often the case, when there
is a parallel congressional investigation? How should the issues be resolved?
Let's begin with Mr. Stein.
There was no congressional investigation in your case.
MR. STEIN: There was none, and I had none of the problems that Judge
Walsh was confronted with. There were no questions of immunity, and things
like that. So perhaps someone who was involved in the parallel should speak.
JUDGE ELLIS: Mr. Thompson, you had the same experience.
MR. THOMPSON: Yes. That was not an issue in my investigation.
JUDGE ELLIS: Judge Walsh, the spotlight seems to focus on you here.
JUDGE WALSH: Well, it does on this question because, from the very
beginning, we were confronted with the problem of parallel investigations.
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Those ofyouwho have prosecuted knowaparallel investigation is difficult
on both sides - if you're getting a criminal case ready and have somebody else
working on a civil case, questioning the same witnesses, leading to possible
confusion of your witnesses who are all reluctant to testify.
There was no one who wanted to come in and blow the whistle in our case.
Every witness, from the beginning to the end, was essentially hostile and
sensitive and uneasy in what they were doing, and to have two groups working
with the same witnesses is bad, at best.
MR. STEIN: Judge Walsh, let me ask you this.
JUDGE WALSH: Yes.
MR. STEIN: You said, in reflecting on how you may have done it differ-
ently, you would have used the grand jury.
Quickly?
JUDGE WALSH: No. We had the grand jury fast enough.
MR. STEIN: But you would have brought the key figures before the grand
jury?
JUDGE WALSH: No, no, no, no.
MR. STEIN: How would you -
JUDGE WALSH: I would have used the grand jury to subpoena documents,
but I wouldn't -
MR. STEIN: Okay.
JUDGE WALSH: I think that any of you who have prosecuted know you
have to be very careful, with a hostile witness, before you perpetuate his
testimony. He usually is reluctant at the beginning and he gives more and more
as he gains confidence in you.
So you can't solve the problem that way. But we did have overlap. John
Nields actually had sent out requests to each of the agencies we were
investigating, asking for duplicates of all the documents they gave me. So
whatever I requested, he was asking for duplicates - so that we were being
followed from the back as we went ahead, but -
JUDGE ELLIS: Did you ask Congress to refrain?
JUDGE WALSH: No. I think we asked John not to, and I can't remember
whether he agreed to or not. He'll tell you when he gets up here.
But I must say that we worked weekly with counsel for the two
committees- JohnNields and ArthurLyman-and theywerejust as cooperative
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asthey couldbe. We had different objectives; we had differenttime constraints;
and they did their best to accommodate it, but it was difficult.
One of the key elements of proof in the case were Swiss records.
Under the treaty, Switzerland would produce those records, but only to
a law enforcement agency, not to Congress, which they regarded as a political
agency. So Congress couldn't get the Swiss records which had all of the details
of the diversion of the funds from the Iranian arms sales to support the Contras,
and so they had to give immunity to one of the persons that I intended to
prosecute, Albert Hakim, who was the treasurer of the Contra supply enterprise.
Now, then the ultimate problem came with giving immunity to North and
Poindexter, who were very important to us, first, as defendants and targets and
then as a possible source of information.
JUDGE ELLIS: I take it, though, you would say that the problem of
immunity is one of the principal problems.
Mr. Fiske.
JUDGE WALSH: Well, let me just say one more thing.
Under the law, Congress has the ultimate word, and it should be that way.
Congress should make the decision as to whether it should grant immunity or
not, and they are really the supreme governing agency in our government. And
if they conclude that for political reasons - high-level political reasons - it is
important to tell the public, the prosecutor should be subordinated.
JUDGE ELLIS: Mr. Fiske.
MR. FISKE: Yes. I did also have some experience with congressional
investigations during my tenure.
I agree completely with what Judge Walsh says about Congress having
the ultimate authority.
Within a month after I had started, Congress announced that it was intending
to have hearings into the very issues I was investigating both in Arkansas and
Washington, and I went to the leadership of the two committees and asked them
to hold up their hearings because I felt itwould interfere with our investigation,
and they said, "We're not going to give anybody immunity; you don't have to
worry about that." But I had the same concern about them calling people in,
putting them under oath, and having them tell a story that would lock them in
that would make them basically useless as witnesses later if it turned out that
story prematurely told was false.
The Democrats controlled Congress at the time and they were receptive
to my request to hold up hearings and the Republicans wanted to go forward,
and we finally negotiated sort of an unhappy compromise, which was - I was
working on some aspects of this in Washington - I said, "When I finish that,
then I would have no objectiontoyour going forward on those issues, butI don't
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want to have hearings going on into what's going on in Arkansas." And that's
the way it worked out, but there were some very unhappy voices.
A congressman from Wisconsin-this was right about the time of the O.J.
Simpson arrest - said, "This is like saying to us, 'You can't ask him about the
knife'; you can't ask him about the bloody glove; all you can say is, 'Say, O.J.,
how was the trip to Chicago?"'
But I think the reaction to Congress to holding up an investigation that
may interfere with a prosecutor's investigation probably depends in large part
on political considerations.
JUDGE ELLIS: Now, I promised this unruly bunch that before we ended
this panel, each would have an unfettered opportunity to express his views about
whether the independent statute should be changed or indeed scrapped.
We are going to be very brief-two minutes each - and we will begin now
with Judge Walsh.
JUDGE WALSH: Briefly, the purpose of the statute, it grew out of the
Saturday Massacre in which Archie Coxwas fired because he subpoenaed the
President's records and the Solicitor General carried outthe President's direction
to fire him.
The idea was to get someone who couldn't be dealt with that way.
The purpose also was, where there is a real possible conflict of interest
of the Attorney General, to give him or her a double insulation. Not only can
she or he appoint an independent counsel themselves, they can also ask a court
to do it so the Attorney General is out of the appointive process.
Now, the statute is overbroad.
In the debate within the American Bar Association which developed the
original concept, there was a question of whether the request for appointment
of an independent counsel should be discretionary or mandatory. I happened
to favor the discretionary against the mandatory, but the mandatory prevailed.
If there is to be a mandatory appointment, I think many of us agree that
this requirement should be limited to the President, the Attorney General and-
actually, we have language here that Jake Stein and Archie Cox worked with
me on - or, actually, they're the draftsmen - it should be limited to a criminal
abuse of power by the President or the Attorney General in the performance
of the official duties of their office.
In other words, it shouldn't be a question of whether Hamilton Jordan
smoked pot in a nightclub for which an independent counsel was once appointed
or whether somebody had a mistress, and it should not relate to matters that
occurred before a person took office. It should be limited to emphasize that
it should be an important matter. In Iran-Contra there was a constitutional
confrontation. In Watergate there was sordid activity by the President himself.
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There may be room for language which would narrow it even further by
emphasizing the need for something important and not trivial.
Now, that is my feeling.
JUDGE ELLIS: All right. Now, Mr. Thompson has the distinction of being
the only one of our independent prosecutors who is not aformer independent
prosecutor. He is a current independent prosecutor, with pending matters, and
that may -
Do you wish to have your two minutes or -
MR. THOMPSON: I will defer. I do have some post-conviction litigation
going on, and I think it would be appropriate for me to just pass on that question.
JUDGE ELLIS: All right. Mr. Stein.
MR. STEIN: I think someone with the power the office confers should have
a tolerance for the idea that you cannot rectify all the wrongs in the world; you
can't pursue all the leads that come to you; and you've got to have the courage
to close the investigation in spite of the fact thatjust when you're ready to close
it, you get a letter from somebody who says that he has the goods on your man-
he's got the goods and he will produce a woman in your office 10:30 tomorrow
morning to blow this investigation wide open.
That's after you've been in office for, let's say, three months.
And suppose he's got the goods.
Well, he's got you, but you've got to have the courage to say, "We're
through, we're closing down."
Thank you.
JUDGE ELLIS: All right. Mr. Fiske.
MR. FISKE: Well, I already said I think the statute should be limited to
top officials in the Executive Branch - the President, the Vice President, the
Attorney General, basically the same limitations that Jamie Gorelick listed.
There is one aspectthat I would like to deal with, which goes back to what
Bill Barr and Jamie Gorelick were talking about: the constraints on the Attorney
General inthe investigation thatthe Attorney General herself or himself conducts
to decide whether to appoint an independent counsel in the first place.
I see absolutely no reason, it makes no sense, why the Attorney General
is not allowed to use the grand jury, not allowed to use the same prosecutorial
resources that he or she would ordinarily use in any other case in order to make
this crucially important decision.
And the last point I would make is that I do think that it is very important
that the independent counsel have the authority to pursue related matters when
those related matters involve the use of a key witness that the independent
counsel may not want to turn over to someone else and, secondly, when those
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related matters, in his or her judgment, are reasonably designed to produce,
in one way or another, evidence against the subject of the investigation.
JUDGE ELLIS: Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in thanking the panel.
(Applause.)
Panel Four - Congressional Investigations
CHIEF JUDGE WILKINSON: Our fourth phase ofthe independent counsel
program will deal with the question of congressional investigations, and this
time we will hear about the whole question of congressional investigations from
the point of view ofthose who worked on such investigations in Congress. And
so I will ask Chief Judge Haden of the Southern District of West Virginia to
introduce the next panel.
JUDGE CHARLES H. HADEN II (Chief Judge, Southern District of West
Virginia): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
Up to this point, the primary focus of the discussion has been on the
independent counsel operation and how selected, et cetera. Our focus for this
panel is on the counterpoint of recent years - the congressional investigation.
At the outset, I would remind you that the independent counsel statute has
had a very brief life in the history of the country. It was enacted first in 1978,
sunsetted in 1992 and, as previously remarked, was reinvigorated and reinstated
in 1994, and it has a limited life through the end of 1999."'
On the other hand, before and after the advent of the independent counsel
statute, Congress has freely exercised its authority to conduct investigations
within the scope of its constitutional powers.
A congressional investigation, for our purposes, is a focused aspect of
legislative oversight which shares the common goals of(l) informing Congress
as to the best means of accomplishing its task in developing legislation;
(2) monitoring the implementation of public policy; and finally, (3) disclosing
to the public how its government is performing. This inquisitorial process also
sustains and vindicates Congress's role in the constitutional scheme of separated
powers and checks and balances.
When push comes to shove in the constitutional and policy arena, it is,
as one of our previous speakers has conceded, thought generally that the
congressional investigation, so long as it stays within the sphere of its authority,
is paramount over independent counsel or other executive or quasi-executive
authorized investigations that might conflict with or parallel a congressional
purpose.
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599.
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Conflicts have arisen between Congress and the executive over congres-
sional investigations since the Union was formed.
For you who have an interest in the history of it, the first clash occurred
when Congress investigated the failed Sinclair Expedition in 1792, where former
revolutionary soldiers, who had defeated the British, were soundly vanquished
by native Americans in the Northwest Territory.
Beyond the memory of most ofus, but not some who are present here today,
there was also the Teapot Dome Scandal investigation during the Harding
administration; and the ones we are all aware of include Watergate, Iran-Contra,
Whitewater and, most recently, the seminal investigation of campaign
contributions from foreign supporters to candidates for important offices. And
like other speakers, I too would not put a name on that investigation. I don't
think the media has yet informed us what the appropriate final name is.
Our focus today compares and contrasts areas of direct conflict that can
occur when Congress and the independent counsel are charged with investigating
the same event and the same people. In any such parallel investigation, there
is always that tension created by Congress's need to oversee the activities of
government and to inform the public about overriding issues of public policy,
that is, again, how the public's government is being conducted, with that of
the independent counsel on the other hand, whose interest generally is to
investigate criminal activity of events and persons in high offices and with the
power that has never yet been exercised by an independent counsel to refer
certain officeholders to Congress for impeachment.
Preeminent among Congress's various powers to investigate, but perhaps
most dangerous to the success of an independent counsel prosecution, as
previous speakers have noted, is the prospect of a grant of broad immunity to
witnesses who may appear before Congress pursuant to the immunity statute
of 1970-18 United States Code, Section 6000, and the following subsections.52
Our panelists will no doubt discuss the implications of either the granting
or withholding of immunity to prospective congressional witnesses.
There are also other essential tools that many ofus from outside the Beltway
are less acquainted with, and those are - and they have to do with legislative
oversight-the power of subpoena, staff interviews, staff depositions, and the
contempt power, the employment of which, either singly or together, may
overshadow the success or failure of a concurrent investigation conducted by
an independent counsel.
Our two panelists today bring a wealth of opinions and also years of
experience to the conduct of or reaction to congressional investigations, vis-a-vis
a concurrent independent counsel investigation.
I will introduce both briefly.
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1994).
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Mr. Richard Leon, to my left, and Mr. John Nields are fully covered in
the biographical information on page 13 of the program, but for our purposes
today, suffice it to say that Mr. Leon has served as deputy or chief counsel to
the United States House Republican members on three different congressional
investigations: Whitewater, October Surprise, and Iran-Contra.
Dick Leon also is an adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law
Center, where he teaches a course that is the very subject of this panel -
congressional investigations. He teaches that with another person we had hoped
to have present here today, John Podesta, who is Deputy Counsel to the President
and who, no doubt, views this whole affair with a somewhat different perspec-
tive, but Professor Podesta was unavailable.
Mr. Nields has also functioned as Special Counsel for the United States
Department of Justice to prosecute top officials of the FBI in the case of United
States v. Gray.53 But more relevant to this point here today, Mr. Nields served
as Chief Counsel for congressional Democratic members, the relevant
congressional committees investigating Koreagate and Iran-Contra. And also
Mr. Nields, I hope, in his explanation, will distinguish for us, if it has not been
done already, the difference between a special counsel and an independent
counsel.
I also note for you that the program is in error in describing Mr. Nields
as independent counsel for Iran-Contra. I think Judge Walsh should take full
credit for that.
In any event, I suggest that both of our panelists have extensive experience
in protecting the integrity of valid congressional investigations while working
at all times to avoidjeopardyto the success ofa concurrent independent counsel
investigation, and they come to us with a wealth of talent. I think both of them
are pretty good speakers on the subject.
I will commence with the first question, and that is:
If criminal investigations, John Nields, primarily are the responsibility
of the independent counsel, what role or purpose should congressional
investigations play? And how does what is being investigated play a role in
defining the scope of the congressional investigation?
MR. JOHN W. NIELDS, JR. (Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C.): This
isn't an evasion, butI need to start off by saying thatI bumped into Judge Walsh
last night and told him that I had read the first chapter of his book" and how
much I liked it. Apparently I didn't read far enough.
JUDGE WALSH: It gets better.
53. United States v. Gray, 502 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C.1980).
54. LAWRENcE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CoNTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP
(1997).
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MR. NIELDS: I'll do a little more reading tonight.
I did not expect, at the beginning of my career, that Iwould end up speaking
on behalf of Congress at an event like this. I began as an Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney, doing criminal prosecutions, and we thoughtthat Congress was hopelessly
political and no place where any professional could do his job, but I have now
done two congressional investigations for Congress and here I am, and I'll do
the best I can.
Congress's functions in the kind of area we are talking about here are very
important, and they are very different from those of an independent counsel,
and they are different in ways that you could be confused about if you get your
understanding of independent counsels from reading the press.
Congress performs a kind of watchdog function over the Executive Branch
of our government. Congress holds hearings to explore issues of public policy
about howwe govern ourselves. Congress uncovers and exposes and publicizes
misuse of government power, abuse of government power. Congress frequently
targets particular individuals in the Executive Branch to expose misfeasance,
with the result that those individuals resign or are, in some manner, run out of
office; and very occasionally- and we hope this is very occasionally- Congress
actually has an impeachment function.
This work of Congress is verypolitical. Itis sometimes partisan. Itis often
not pretty to look at, but it is very important. We live in a democracy in which
the government is supposed to be accountable to the voters, and the voters can't
perform their function unless they know what their government has done.
Congress also obviously has the responsibility for passing laws and I, for
one, hope that at the end of the unnamed campaign finance investigation,
Congress will actually address the issue of appropriate remedial legislation.
But for the purposes of this discussion, it is really its watchdog function, I think,
that comes into play; and, as I say, it is a political function, and it is very
different from the function of an independent counsel, which is, or at least should
be, not political at all.
The independent counsel is not a good way of finding out whether the
government is performing its job correctly or whether there are, in general,
people in government who are engaged in some manner of misfeasance. It is
not a good way of doing that, first of all, because an independent counsel
functions in secret under grand jury secrecy as independent counsel, as all
prosecutors should. They frequently take a very long time to get the answer
to the question, and their scope is much narrower than Congress's. They are
to answer the question of whether someone should be prosecuted for crimes.
Most of the misconduct in government does not result in violation of criminal
laws or at least violations that ought to be prosecuted. And finally and most
important, the independent counsel and any prosecutor's office ought not to
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be attemptingto serve apolitical role. They should be serving arole offerreting
out and prosecuting crime. It is a role ofjustice, not politics.
So Congress has a very important role in the kind of arena we are talking
about, and it is different from - and we will get into this deeper as we go
forward - from the function of the independent counsel.
JUDGE HADEN: Mr. Leon, do you want to try your Pand at that?
MR. RICHARD J. LEON (Baker & Hostetler, Washington, D.C.): Well,
it is a broad topic but a worthy one.
I think, as a general proposition, it has been very interesting to see the
reversal that has occurred over the ten years since I first worked as a counsel
to a congressional investigation as a colleague of John on the Iran-Contra
investigation. Since the three occasions I've worked on congressional
investigations, we have seen both the Congress and the administration change
hands, and with it we have seen a new phenomenon that is rather interesting.
When the Republicans controlled the White House and the Democrats controlled
the Congress, the Republicans were always bitching and moaning that there
were too many Democratic congressional investigations of the White House.
Well, since it has turned around a hundred and eighty degrees, the Democrats
are complaining that there's too much investigating of the Executive Branch
by the Republican-controlled Congress.
I think the bottom line is that Congress has its institutional responsibilities,
and it has to exercise them in a responsible way.
Of the investigations that I've been involved in, two of the three had public
hearings, Iran-Contra and Whitewater I- Whitewater I being the initial Congres-
sional investigation into contacts between White House and treasury officials
that occurred in 1994 when Bob Fiske was serving as the Special Counsel. There
was no question, there was no issue, that it was appropriate and necessary for
public hearings to occur in both of these investigations. In both instances the
Democrats controlled the Congress of the United States. And even within the
Congress, there was no real serious issue as to whether there should be public
hearings.
I think Congress, for the most part, especially through the leadership that
has been exerted by the chairmen and ranking members who ran these
committees, has exercised this power in a responsible way, as has the counsel
that they have retained. Where Congress has gotten into trouble is when they
have stopped focusing on legislating and educating the American people, which
are their constitutional responsibilities, and started using the congressional
investigative process for either political pontificating or to gain some form of
leverage over the opposite party. The classic example of that was the one
investigation I was involved in, during which an independent counsel was not
appointed. That investigation, where I served as chief counsel for the Republi-
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cans, was calledthe "October Surprise" investigation, and itwas an investigation
into the then sitting President George Bush during the election year 1992. The
House Democrats in that case decided that it was appropriate to do a $1.35
million investigation into twelve-year-old allegations about alleged conduct
by President Bush and others to conspire with Iranians to hold back the release
of the American hostages from Iran. That was the decision of the leadership
in Congress. And as a result of that decision- and I might add we were fortunate
to have Lee Hamilton, who had served as chairman ofthe Iran-Contra committee,
as the chairman of that investigation and Henry Hyde as the ranking member-
we conducted an investigation in abipartisan manner andwe issued a bipartisan
report which completely cleared President Bush and President Reagan of the
allegations that had been brought during that campaign year.
So Congress sometimes can be its own worst enemy-there's no question
about it- but if you think about the various independent counsel investigations
that have been going on recently, you haven't seen Congress overreacting.
Indeed, there are, or have been, independent counsel investigations during
this administration with regard to Secretary Cisneros, Secretary Brown, and
Secretary Espy, but you haven't had major congressional investigations with
regard to any of those.
With regard to Whitewater, we have reached a pointnowwhere Whitewater
is used as kind of a catch-all phrase. I think it is very dangerous to do that
because "Whitewater" had some very distinct components to it. As Bob Fiske
was faced with the responsibility of sorting those components out, so too, I think,
we, in our discussion of the interrelationship between congressional and inde-
pendent counsel investigations, must also sort those components out.
The component of the Whitewater affair that related to questionable con-
tacts between senior Treasury Department officials and senior White House
officials, and which was the subject of the three weeks of congressional
investigations we held in the summer of '94, when Bob Fiske was special counsel
and I was serving as Jim Leach's special counsel, were never questioned by
anyone. Indeed, that investigation unmasked improper conduct atthe very senior
levels of the administration that resulted in the resignation of the Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury, the General Counsel of the Treasury Department,
and senior White House officials.
Travelgate and Filegate, which are other components under the
"Whitewater" umbrella, have not been critically questioned as inappropriate
topics for Congress to be investigating, even though technically they have been
appended to Judge Starr's agenda.
So I think, when we use the term "Whitewater," we have to be careful to
parse the various components of it. And I think, for the most part, despite the
pontificating that goes on by certain congressional gadflies and the press,
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Congress has exercised its constitutional responsibilities with gravity and with
great concern.
JUDGE HADEN: The next question has to do with timing and the success
ofeither a congressional or an independent counsel investigation or the success
or failure of both.
As a matter of policy, I would put to Mr. Leon first, should congressional
investigations precede or follow an independent counsel investigation? And
if, or more appropriately when, a conflict develops between the two concurrent
investigations, what tools can you use to minimize that conflict?
And that latter part, I might say, I'm certain I'd be interested in hearing
about use of the subpoena power, the various methods of legislative oversight.
MR. LEON: Well, it is a tough question to answer, Your Honor, because
it proceeds on an assumption that you could have an ideal world and, of course,
you don't.
I think experience has shown, since Iran-Contra, certainly, and inthe various
situations where there have been congressional investigations that have had
great public credibility, that Congress is wise to exercise self-restraint as to
when it conducts these kinds of investigations, and how it goes about conducting
them.
I think, in the case of Iran-Contra, even though John and I were working
for members on opposite sides of the aisle, we were pretty much in agreement
that it was a situation that necessitated an airing of the problem. A cloud had
descended, so to speak, over the administration, and it had to be looked into.
Neither President Reagan nor his administration would have been able to
function effectively for the remaining two-year period of his administration
without some attempt to look into what was going on.
I think the hearings that took place at that time obviously had to occur,
even though Judge Walsh was going to take awhile to finish up his job.
So I think with respect to timing in the real world - it's hard to say which
should go first or which should go second. I think, if Congress restricts itself,
for the most part, to conducting its investigations and televising its hearings
to those situations where there is a grave concern, not only within the Congress
but within the country, whether or not the government, at its highest levels, is
either not functioning or functioning improperly, then in that type of situation-
of which Iran-Contra was clearly an example - it is appropriate for Congress
to go first.
I think, as a general proposition, Congress should try to refrain, as it has
in the Cisneros, Brown, and Espy investigations, from conducting investigations
into criminal behavior that an independent counsel is pursuing. And I think
Congress for the most part has done that.
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JUDGE HADEN: John.
MR. NIELDS: Yes, I think it is hard to generalize. There are a number
of issues, immunity being the most important one orthe most difficult one, the
one where the conflict is clearest.
There was a time when itwas thought thata congressional hearing created
the kind of publicity that would make a criminal prosecution impossible or
require the delay of a criminal prosecution. Courts have pretty much come to
the view that the publicity issues can be dealt with with interrogation ofjurors
and sequestration of the jury, and so on. But obviously, if Congress does not
have an important interest in having apublic investigation, it is creating problems
for the criminal justice process by holding one at the wrong time and should
refrain.
There is also the issue that Bob Fiske mentioned earlier that everybody
is tromping over the same witnesses; and in an ideal world, you would have
one investigation dealing with one set of witnesses, not two or three or four
investigations. But if you have a situation, which I think we are all assuming
here, where there is a role for an independent counsel-a criminal investigation-
and also a role for Congress, those two issues you simply have to work out;
andI would say I've done this twice for Congress, once when there was a Justice
Department investigation parallel to me and once when there was an independent
counsel investigation parallel to me, and actually I had an easier time dealing
with the independent counsel in Iran-Contra than the Justice Department in
Koreagate.
But the critical issue obviously is the immunity issue. Congress does have
the final authority to decide whether it is going to grant immunity,55 and if
Congress does, it's a pretty sure bet that it's going to mess up the criminal
prosecution.
MR. LEON: I would add one point in that regard, John.
I think the Congress, in its wisdom, has provided in the immunity statute
that the congressional vote to grant immunity must be a two-thirds majority,
notjust a simple majority. By creating thatrequirementinthe statute, Congress
has acknowledged that a decision to grant immunity is a very serious decision
that should not be taken lightly and a decision that should be bipartisan by
nature.
Getting a two-thirds vote is no small task. We obviously succeeded in
that regard in Iran-Contra, and there have been other instances, too. But in
Iran-Contra we had a vote of a bipartisan majority - a clear majority - of the
committee.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 6005.
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So I think it is important to stress what Mr. Fiske and Judge Walsh said
earlier this morning that it is Congress that ultimately has the authority - the
ultimate authority in this area. I think Congress has been pretty careful in
choosing their opportunities to do that.
MR. NIELDS: In the Iran-Contra situation, it is, I think, fair to say that
everyone knew going in that Congress was going to do a thorough investigation
and wasn't going to stop short of immunizing the witnesses that it needed to
get there. I don't recall what the actual vote was when we eventually hit the
issue, butI know that there was overwhelming support on both Republican and
Democratic sides in both the House and the Senate to compel the testimony
under immunity of both North and Poindexter. There was a view expressed
by one or two members of Congress that the way to handle that investigation,
a la Watergate, was to hold off, let Judge Walsh prosecute and convict North
and Poindexter, and then he would have maximum leverage to turn them against
the President. That view was expressed, and I think people understood that
that was a way that would increase the likelihood that at the end of it, the
President would be gotten; but the overwhelming view was that that was not
our job and that we had ajob that was very important, and I think you've got
to look at each one of these investigations on its own facts.
One issue that is goingto matter is: Is the issue athand one that is primarily
and at its core a criminal law problem or is it, at its core, something else? We
thought, for example, that Watergate was, at its core, a criminal law problem.
Itblossomed into many otherthings, but at its core was a break-in-I don'tknow
if it was a third-rate burglary, but it was a burglary - and that it was a cover-up
of the burglary and who participated in the burglary.
The Iran-Contra affair is closer to what Judge Walsh said a little bit earlier.
It was a real constitutional confrontation. Something very wrong had happened
about the way we govern ourselves and about the way Congress and the
executive branch dealt with each other, and it was understood by all to go very
probably to the top official in the Executive Branch, the President, and it was
an open question, when we began our investigation whether the result of it would
be the toppling of the government or of the President himself.
People can differ about how likely that was, regardless of how the facts
turned out, butthatwas an issuethatwas in ourminds and in the public's minds,
and it was viewed as paramount that we, in a reasonably expeditious fashion,
answer that question so that the public would know whether this was an issue
that ought to result in a change of government of some kind or not, and you
couldn't do that, we thought - and I think everybody believed that - without
compelling testimony from North and Poindexter.
Now, again, each one of these things is going to look different.
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The campaign finance investigation may be one in which the public policy
issues outweigh the criminal law issues.
Whitewater- at least the original Whitewater- seems obviously to be one
that has a criminal law question in it and almost no public policy question in
it, and each investigation is going to look a little different.
MR. LEON: I take issue with you, John, though, as to several of the
component parts ofWhitewater. Ithinkthere are at least three component parts
under the umbrella of Whitewater that clearly have the public policy allure you
mentioned. One was the one that we focused our hearings on in the summer
of'94 involving the questionable contacts between senior Treasury Department
officials and senior White House officials.
I think Filegate and the Travelgate components of Whitewater are two
others where there are very clear public policy and good government issues.
Educating the American people as to what was going on as to them - how it
could be that these FBI files on these officials were all of a sudden showing
up where they were - is appropriately the subject of congressional inquiry.
So I think those components of Whitewater, at a minimum, have to be
segregated out from under the umbrella of "Whitewater" as being topics that
merit that kind of attention.
MR. NIELDS: Yes, I agree with that. I think that I was referring to the
land -
MR. LEON: Arkansas deal -
MR. NIELDS: The land deal.
One question, I guess, which is sort of out there is whether the history of
theNorth-Poindexter immunities and reversals of their convictions has changed
the map and the analysis.
JUDGE HADEN: That is what I wanted to follow up with John in that
regard.
Knowing that some of these investigations are hybrid and the question
needs yet to be resolved, after investigation or after some portion of the
investigation, whether it is a public policy issue or a criminal issue, or both,
what are some of the fallback mechanisms, less than abroad grant of immunity,
that can be used to protect both investigations?
MR. NIELDS: Well, again, I think you have to look at that one case at a
time. It is certainly hypothetically possible that you end up in a congressional
investigation where there is aparallel independent counsel andthe independent
counsel has an interest in one or two people and one very small area and
Congress can simply agree to stay out of that area. But most of the time I think
it is going to be the way it was in Iran-Contra, and I think we probably would
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be kidding ourselves ifwe thought that we could have some sort of limited area
of taking testimony or some sort of plan for keeping the congressional immu-
nized testimony secret for a long period of time so that the prosecution could
move forward. I suspect that most of the time it is going to come at Congress
the way it did in Iran-Contra, which is, if you do it, you've got to do it knowing
that there is a very high probability that you're going to mess up the criminal
prosecution.
And I think that what has happened is that because of what occurred in
fact, which was the reversal of the convictions, the public and the press is now
putting more pressure on Congress to stay out of immunity in a parallel
investigation, and I think Congress will in fact stay out in most cases. Whether
they would stay out if the Iran-Contra affair issues presented themselves anew
in the same form next year, I doubt, but I think that is open to question.
MR. LEON: I think, from an institutional point of view, there certainly
has been a lot of discussion and a lot of statements made by various congressio-
nal chairmen, ranking members, and leadership members to suggest that they
are bending over backwards, in the aftermath of North and Poindexter, to be
deferential to the independent counsel investigation and not step on the toes
of the independent counsel.
I think we certainly heard that kind of talk from Chairman Gonzalez and
ranking member Leach in WhitewaterI and in the Senate from Chairman Riegle,
ranking Republican and later chairman D'Amato, and ofcourse, rankingDemo-
cratic Senator Sarbanes. Congress also has been responsible in selecting as
its chief counsels in almost every instance that I can think of people such as
John and I, who were former federal prosecutors and who are very sensitive
to, and appreciative of, the difficulty of the position ofan Independent Counsel
and the collateral consequences of their decisions.
JUDGE HADEN: Dick, let me ask you: On the question of politics, do
you believe that the independent counsel process, where there is a concurrent
congressional investigation, has become irretrievably politicized where we are
now, in operating with these two types of investigations?
MR. LEON: Well, that is a hard question to answer.
I think there's definitely been heightened and more concerted criticism
and attack on our independent counsels, particularly Independent Counsel Starr.
I think this is very disturbing and, in some ways, a matter of great concern.
We have never seen before, to the extent we have seen to date, I don't think,
the kind of concerted attack against an independent counsel that we have seen
in Mr. Starr's case. There have been press reports - and I'm not in a position
to validate them-that these attacks are being coordinated by political operatives
1575
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515 (1997)
atthe senior levels of a national party, andIthinkthat it is most regrettable and
I think that it should be avoided at all costs.
You know, looking at the chart that was handed out among the materials
here and comparing the number of independent counsels that have been
appointed and the number of congressional investigations that have occurred
contemporaneous with them, I think Congress obviously has gotten in the act
in criticizing and attacking independent counsels.
I think it is distressing when you have attacks on the appointment process
of independent counsel. I think that is also a new phenomenon. I think Judge
Sentelle and his panel were put through some unprecedented attacks on their
appointment process, and that is not healthy for the process.
So there has been increased sniping, but the bottom line is that the press
and the media love conflict. That is how they make their money; that is what
they're there to report. And there has just been an increased interest, and
increased industry within the media, to seek conflict wherever it is and to report
on it.
JUDGE HADEN: John.
MR. NIELDS: Well, I think that sort of a short answer to your question
is yes, but it is not just the independent counsel statute.
The thing that sort of resonates in my head is reading The Washington
Post-I think it was the day afterNewt Gingrich was made Speaker- and there
was an article that essentially said, "Okay. Now he's Speaker, what are we going
to investigate him for?" And the House Ethics Committee then, you know,
answered the call, and that was a committee that I once represented.
We started off with a really, really important and good, American idea,
which was that everybody, including the highest official in our government,
is under the law and should not be treated any differently because of his station
than an ordinary citizen. It is a rule of neutrality and equality in our criminal
justice system. It is areally important idea, and the independent counsel statute
was designed to preserve it. But what we have moved to, it seems to me, is
a very different idea and a very bad idea, which is that we are going to use our
criminal justice system against our high officials in a way that is much worse
and harsher than the way we use it against ordinary citizens.
It is very important that our high officials be subjected to a special kind
of scrutiny because of what they do. They have power and it is very important
that we watch them carefully, but that is a political function and that should
be done through the political process. It should not be done through our criminal
justice system.
MR. LEON: I can't resist responding to one thing John said.
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I think the pendulum has swung as far as it is going to go within Congress,
and it is now swinging back in the other direction. For example, the members
of Congress have grown so concerned about the use of the ethics process within
the House as a political weapon of choice that they just recently convened a
task force to come up with bipartisan reform of the ethics process in the hope
that they can make it less partisan.
So I think Congress recognizes that this whole investigative process may
have gone too far. I think Congress is attempting, perhaps not perfectly, to get
itself more in the other direction. Ultimately, when you have people like Lee
Hamilton and Henry Hyde and Dick Cheney running investigations, you get
a high-quality product.
MR. NIELDS: I would just like to say it is not enough, in my view, that
the ultimate decision whether to prosecute or not is made in a professional way.
As far as I can tell, independent counsels have all done that. I can't think of
a single example of an exception to that. We have had objective and fair
decisions. But the decision of who you investigate is also important and, for
the reasons I think Jake Stein mentioned and many others, that the question
of who you use your criminal investigative powers against is just as important
as whether you make a good decision at the end of the investigation.
JUDGE HADEN: As kind of a final question for this panel, I think several
of the speakers, including the two here, have alluded to the enormous power
the media brings to bear on the concurrent investigations of this type, and I
suppose my questionto you would be: Has the media played, in your estimation,
since Watergate and considering all the investigations since, a constructive or
a negative role in this process, on balance?
MR. LEON: John, do you want to go first?
MR. NIELDS: I am going to sort of repeat myself.
The media plays an absolutely essential role in watchdogging the
government. They probably do a more importantjob of that than the Congress
does, and it is very important that that be done. We can't function as a
democracy unless it is done. But the problem is they don't understand how
wrong it is to try to crank up the criminal justice system as part of that effort,
and I used to hear people suggest this - and it only made me mad but now it's
true-the criminal justice process is being used as aweapon in political warfare,
and the press doesn't understand that that's wrong and they help make it happen,
and it is very, very destructive.
MR. LEON: I think, if the press reflects a little bit more upon it, the press
should realize that being party to concerted attempts to undermine and attack
the appointment process of independent counsels, and the conduct of inde-
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pendent counsels, is ultimately not in the best interests of the system. It is also
not in the best interests of fair play, and it is not in the best interests of the
institutions that they are covering.
JUDGE HADEN: Gentlemen, do either of you, or both, have closing
remarks?
MR. NIELDS: I think I made mine.
MR. LEON: That's mine.
JUDGE HADEN: Well, the audience will join me in thanking a very
knowledgeable and entertaining panel. Thank you.
(Applause.)
Panel Five - The Future of the Independent Counsel Process
CHIEF JUDGE WILKINSON: We are ready now for the final panel this
morning, and that will take a look at the overall independent counsel process
and what does the future hold for the independent counsel statute.
With that in mind, I will ask Judge Davis to assemble his panel.
JUDGE ANDRE M. DAVIS (U.S. District Judge, District of Maryland):
Good morning again, ladies and gentlemen.
I say, with great confidence, that those of you with the endurance and
stamina to stick around will be rewarded. We have a spectacular panel, as you
can see. I commend to your reviewthe biographical sketches contained in your
programs, but I will briefly introduce the four panelists for this, the fifth and
final panel this morning.
To my far left, your far right, we are pleased to have the Honorable Henry
J. Hyde, congressman from Illinois, who has represented the Sixth District of
Illinois for more than twenty years in the Congress.
We are particularly pleased to have Congressman Hyde as a guest here
at the Fourth Circuit, for he is a friend of the federaljudiciary and we appreciate
his work.
Next to Congressman Hyde is Mr. Theodore B. Olson, who has, for more
than thirty years, conducted a national law practice, with stints in the Justice
Department, and, like all of the panelists, has been intimately involved in many
ways with the independent counsel process, as he will address, I'm sure.
To my right, we have Terry Eastland, a Fellow at the Ethics and Public
Policy Center in Washington, D.C. Terry, unlike all the other panelists this
morning, brings his wisdom and insight into this process unburdened by a formal
legal education. So I think we can look with anticipation at what he has to say.
Finally, of course, we have Professor Emeritus Archibald Cox.
1578
FOURTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
I am convinced that many of you in here will remember Professor Cox
from the classroom, but certainly we all remember Professor Cox as the first
special prosecutor in the modem era and whose circumstances in connection
with his role as special prosecutor in 1973 and the manner and means by which
that role came to an end obviously created the ground swell of support for the
independent counsel statute, and certainly Professor Cox has very clear and
firm ideas about what the process holds.
Our charge has been to focus on the fundamental question of: Should we
permit the sun to set on this thing in 1999? And if not what might we provide
to Chairman Hyde this morning to take back to the Congress in the way of ideas
as to how the statute might be improved upon?
We are going to do that first by taking a retrospective look at some of the
specific investigations.
I have encouraged the panelists to provide a critique in response to the
following question, specifically: Are there particular independent counsel
investigations thatyou believe are models of what such an investigation should
be? And to tell us why.
And they have assured me that they are willing and happy to do that.
We will go on from there to talk a little bit more about how the statute,
if it is to remain in effect, might be changed properly.
Let me start with Professor Cox.
Professor Cox, canyoupointto any models of investigations that you would
hold up for future consideration by future independent counsels?
PROFESSOR ARCHIBALD COX (Harvard Law School, Cambridge,
Massachusetts): I think the first investigation of Edwin Meese by Jacob Stein
was probably a case for which something like the independent counsel procedure
is needed, and thatthe investigation was pressed forward quickly and efficiently.
That is the only case that I would say was an example of the way it should
go in terms of what the statute ought to be.
MR. STEIN: I want to thank you for that from the floor.
PROFESSOR COX: The Iran-Contra affair seems to me to be an example
of a situation where such a statute is needed, but the investigation was, to some
extent, made less useful than it might have been by forces outside of Judge
Walsh's control.
IfI may, I would say that Watergate again illustrates the kind of situation
where such a procedure is needed, and I would say that Leon Jaworski's conduct
of the investigation was first rate.
The others, I think, shouldn't be covered by such a statute. So I would
list them all on your bad category.
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JUDGE DAVIS: What would you point to, Professor Cox, with respect
to the Meese investigation that made it especially appropriate?
PROFESSOR COX: His high rank in the White House.
JUDGE DAVIS: Is there any aspect as to the conduct of the investigation
that you wish to cover?
PROFESSOR COX: No, I wouldn't, except that it was done quickly, -
JUDGE DAVIS: So speed and -
PROFESSOR COX: - effectively.
JUDGE DAVIS: Speed and efficiency is virtue.
PROFESSORCOX: Provided they also are fair and thorough, and I believe
it was.
JUDGEDAVIS: Congressman Hyde, are there any past investigations that
you would hold up as a model of either an excellentjob or less than desirable
job?
CONGRESSMAN HENRY J. HYDE (Chairman, House Judiciary Committee,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.): Well, I think the Ray Donovan
investigation finally gave him some measure of clearance, which is important
in the interest ofjustice. It is hard to be critical of any of them without having
an intimate knowledge of the problems they encountered.
Judge Walsh catches a lot of criticism because of the length of the investi-
gation, but his problem was complicated by our investigation. I remember Judge
Walsh coming up and pleading with us to defer this and defer that, but we were
hell-bent- and I say "we" -the Democrats wanted to move into the public arena
because they were going to nail Ronald Reagan and this was an opportunity
too good to be missed. But it did complicate and get in the way of what Judge
Walsh was doing, particularly on the immunity. They were willing to give
immunity to anybody if it would lead to the top gun. It didn't, which of course
breaks my heart, but Judge Walsh had lots of problems. But I really wouldn't
like to rate the various investigations.
I think, in listening to Mr. Stein, he clearly didn't want to nail Ed Meese,
and I don't think an independent counsel should want to nail anybody. They
should go where the evidence leads them. So I don't really have a report card
on all of them.
JUDGE DAVIS: Mr. Olson.
MR. THEODOREB. OLSON (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C.):
Well, I think I agree with the sentiments of Professor Cox in the sense that I
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think almost everyone who has studied this subject has been asked this kind
of question about, if you can stand this statute at all if we have to have it, how
should it be done.
Jake Stein conducted the best model of an investigation; and I say that
because it was quick, it was relatively short in duration, and it was as quiet as
Jake could make it.
Everybody knew what was happening because it involved the nominee
to be Attorney General of the United States. But Jake is a very discreet guy
and was not talking to the press and conducted it in a very, very discreet way.
It was very specific and narrowly focused. He didn't branch out, as discussed
this morning, into every allegation that might have come to his attention. He
was decisive at the end. He made it clear what he decided and what he was
not going to comment on. And in that respect, he was very prosecutorial in
the sense that he made a prosecutorial judgment; and when invited to by all
kinds of other people, including the press and members of Congress, to comment
on whether Edwin Meese was a suitable candidate for Attorney General or was
he too sloppy in the keeping of his records, or anything, Jake said, "It's not my
business." And members of Congress, as I recall, pressed him to answer these
questions and he said, "I'm not going to answer those questions," and that's
why I think it was a good investigation.
Unfortunately, with respect to the other ones, the institution of the
independent counsel statute causes things to happen that shouldn't happen and
people seem to think that all of a sudden this process has gotten bad and it's
gotten politicized and it's gotten out of control.
Well, this was inevitable from the very beginning because of the nature
of the statute. Some of them have gone on too long, and it may not have been
Judge Walsh's fault that he served in office, as I like to say, longer than World
War II - he served in office longer than President Reagan served as President
of the United States.
The Supreme Court upheld the independent counsel statute in part because
it was a temporary office. Yet Judge Walsh held the office longer than any
Attorney General in the history of the United States, with the exception of one.
There are other things - and I won't spend too much time on this - but
Ed Meese had the good fortune of being investigated by three different
independent counsels, which is, I guess, the hattrick of the independent counsel
world. The second investigation of Ed Meese resulted in a report that said he
was not going to be prosecuted. But the independent counsel issued an opinion
stating that Meese had violated the law and he could have proved it, ifhe wanted
to, and I thought that was a very inappropriate thing to do.
I've got other criticisms of each of the other ones, but don't want to take
up all that time.
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JUDGE DAVIS: Mr. Eastland.
MR. TERRY H. EASTLAND (Ethics & Public Policy Center, Washington,
D.C.): I think it would be important to say at the outset that I wouldn't want
to buy into the notion that if only we had good independent counsels, we should
retain the statute. I would agree with what Ted Olson said - that so much of
what people today - especially today - find problematical with the statute is
built into it in its origins, but ifwe are going to enumerate those who were good
and bad in answering this question, let me say, with respect to Jake Stein - I
will go ahead and praise Jake Stein again - I want to supply some dates.
He began on April 2, 1984, 1 believe it was, and issued his report on the
20th of September. That was a quick investigation and it was thorough, and
it was regarded as such.
The important aspect of his investigation was the fact that in his report
he did not go beyond what I think is the proper mandate of any prosecutor.
He did not opine on the ethics, if you will, of Mr. Meese, instead speaking
directly to the issues that were before him.
So that is what made that a good and, I think, probably the best model,
if you will, of any investigation we have had.
I think the earliest two, the first two - these were appointees during the
Carter administration - Hamilton Jordan and Tim Kraft were both accused of
using cocaine, and both of the independent counsels investigating them had
the good sense to decline to prosecute. These were not ordinarily the kinds
of cases the Justice Department would have brought. So I think, at least in that
respect, those early investigations could be credited; perhaps also the
investigation by Arlin Adams recently that Larry Thompson has now had to
take over, a very long-running one, but as far as I can tell, there have been a
few complaints butnot ofthe kind thatwould lead me to think thatthathas been,
on balance, a badly conducted investigation.
On the other side of the question, I would say that Ed Meese's second
investigation by Mr. McKay was flawed in terms of the final report. In the
report, he said that Mr. Meese had probably - probably - violated federal tax
laws. And again, I don't think it is appropriate for a prosecutor of any kind
to say that someone has probably violated a federal criminal law. You should
do that, I think, in a court of law. You should prove your case, and I think it
is inappropriate to say what was said in that report.
That, by the way, was the first ever use of a report to say something such
as that about an individual under investigation. It had not been done prior to
the McKay report on Ed Meese.
I would also say, with respectto the investigation of Michael Deaver, there
was a problem with that investigation by that independent counsel in that there
was an attempt to subpoena - twice there were attempts to subpoena - the
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Canadian Ambassador. These were resisted by Canada. These were also
objected to by the State Department, and ultimately this effort was undone in
the district courts. But I think, again, an ordinary prosecutor would not have
tried such a thing.
I save the best for last.
I have criticized Judge Walsh publicly. What I have said about him is
already in the record, but I will simply repeat some of those things here.
I think that the conspiracy charge that was brought initially in the
Iran-Contra matter, a very broad-ranging effort dealing with the notion of
defrauding the federal government, that is not the kind of case that I think the
Justice Department would have brought, and certainly even a Watergate-style
appointee out of the Justice Department would not have seen that kind of case
being developed. And, of course, it did not make it, it did not develop as such.
I would say secondly that - and this is not something that Judge Walsh
did alone -there were others in the 1980s - and, again, I would say that these -
what I am speaking of here are-the kind of developments that I would criticize
are really inherent in the nature of the statute, but there were a number of cases
in which the charges concerned representations made by individuals, including
Casper Weinberger, to the Congress, and the point here was that these
individuals had committed crimes, whether it be perjury or whether they be
false statements made to the Congress, and there were no other charges, other
than those dealing with the representations made to Congress, in the indictments.
I think a serious question should be raised here as to whether an independent
counsel should be making those kinds of cases.
Finally, I do think it was inappropriate for Judge Walsh to say, when
President Bush did pardon Casper Weinberger and five others, the Christmas
Day Pardon of 1992- I think it was highly inappropriate to say, as he did, that
Casper Weinberger lies as well to the press as he does to Congress.
Again, I think, if you are going to say that someone is guilty of a crime,
that that should be done formally and not, if you will, to the press.
JUDGE DAVIS: Perhaps we should go straight to the question, then,
Congressman Hyde.
What is the mood in Congress about the statute? And is it likely to survive
the sunset?
CONGRESSMAN HYDE: Well, Congress is in a very political frame of
mind, as you might imagine. It depends whose ox is being gored. When the
Reagan Administration and the Bush Administration were in the White House,
why, there was great Democratic support for independent counsels. Now that
the shoe is on the other foot, the Republicans are looking more kindly at this
institution.
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I think, for myself, I don't like the notion of creating a legal Frankenstein
who is accountable to nobody, with an unlimited bank account, with a charter
that is as comprehensive as many independent counsels have treated it- itjust
lacks accountability. On the other hand, you have situations of conflict of
interest where the public's trust in the system is at risk.
So as Churchill once said, "Democracy is a terrible form of government
except for all the others," and an independent counsel is not a very nice way
to prosecute people, but there may be circumstances where it is necessary.
JUDGE DAVIS: So the statute is a necessary evil?
CONGRESSMAN HYDE: That is my conclusion at this point. I want to
say today's testimony from your panelists has been extraordinarily useful. I'm
hoping to get a transcript of it when you're through because we will have to
look at this for reauthorization purposes, and what has happened here today
is going to be helpful.
But I support it reluctantly because the conflicts of interest are too patent.
They seem to be very patent in this administration, and I think we need the
institution, but itneeds some correction. It needs accountability. Itneeds some
more regular budget authority. It needs a narrower charter so it can't roam all
over the ball park. The targets have to have some rights so that maybe they
come in and appear before the court and say, "Can't we close this long-playing
Eastland down?" So there are changes we need to make, and I would look to
all of you for help in that.
JUDGE DAVIS: Ted, I take it your first choice would be to scuttle the
statute.
MR. OLSON: Yes. I guess I'm on record almost as much as Terry Eastland
is on the subject.
We got along in this country for almost 200 years without an independent
counsel statute, and I want to make the point, which I think others probably
have as well, that there is nothing wrong with the idea of going outside the
Department of Justice to pick someone special to pursue an investigation if
public confidence requires it. Bill Barr, when he was Attorney General, did
that three times, as I heard him describe this morning, and dealt with delicate
matters about which public credibility suggested to him that he ought to get
someone that was not a direct subordinate of the Attorney General or the
Presidentto conduct an investigation. Indeed, as we all know, because of public
pressure on the administration, the Watergate investigation was conducted by
individuals who performed that function without an independent counsel statute.
I think that the thing that is bad about the independent counsel statute is
that it is mandatory in so many respects. It has so many opportunities for use
for political purposes. If you don't mind, I will readjust one paragraph from
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Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson56 which I think, ifyou
were to read anything about this subject that is worth reading again and again,
it is Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion saying that the statute was unconstitu-
tional. It is just a couple of sentences. He says:
How frightening it must be to have your own independent counsel and staff
appointed, with nothing else to do but to investigate you until investigation
is no longer worthwhile-with whether it is worthwhile not depending upon
what such judgments usually hinge on, competing responsibilities. And to
have that counsel and staff decide, with no basis for comparison, whether
what you have done is bad enough, willful enough, and provable enough,
to warrant an indictment. How admirable the constitutional system that
provides the means to avoid such a distortion. And how unfortunate the
judicial decision that has permitted it.57
And I, of course, agree completely with Justice Scalia.
CONGRESSMAN HYDE: Judge Davis, may I intervene, because you are
going to ask Mr. Cox and Mr. Eastland, and I would like to read, as a predicate
to what they might say, something Janet Reno said when we reauthorized the
statute in 1994, and I am quoting from her testimony before the Senate.
In 1975, after his firing triggered the constitutional crisis that led to the first
version of this Act, Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox testified
thatan independent counsel was needed in certain limited cases and he said,
"The pressure, the divided loyalty, are too much for any man, and as honor-
able and conscientious as any individual might be, the public could never
feel entirely easy about the vigor andthoroughness with which the investiga-
tion was pursued. Some outside person is absolutely essential." ...
The reason that I support the concept of an independent counsel with
statutory independence is that there is an inherent conflict whenever senior
Executive Branch officials are to be investigated by the Department and its
appointed head, the Attorney General. The Attorney General serves at the
pleasure of the President. Recognition of this conflict does not belittle or
demean the impressive professionalism of the Department's career prosecu-
tors ....
It is absolutely essential for the public to have confidence in the system
and you cannot do that when there is conflict or an appearance of conflict
in the person who is, in effect, the chief prosecutor. There is an inherent
conflict here, and I think that that is why this Act is so important.
56. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
57. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Independent Counsel Act was designed to avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety in the consideration of allegations ofmisconductby high-
level Executive Branch officials and to prevent... the actual or perceived
conflicts of interest. The Act thus served as a vehicle to firther the public's
perception of fairness and thoroughness in such matters, and to avert even
the most subtle influences that may appear in an investigation of highly-
placed Executive officials."
I might point out parenthetically that she has distanced herself, it seems,
from this sentiment in our current controversy, but I think she said it well, and
I would like to throw that in the mix.
JUDGE DAVIS: Professor Cox, what, if any, evolution have your views
enjoyed in the twenty years since you're quoted there?
PROFESSORCOX: Perhaps it depends a little on how you would interpret
the views as they were expressed before.
I think the present statute contains more evils than benefits - the present
statute. I think it has been widely politicized, with the result that it has lost the
confidence of the public. I think, by losing the confidence of the public, it has
destroyed the real value of such a statute if applied to a very limited number
of cases, such as Judge Walsh suggested earlier. It's been expensive; it's been
expensive to defend it.
I do agree with my earlier statements and with Attorney General Reno to
this extent: I think, in the case of a far narrower number of high officials in
the executive branch-the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General,
perhaps some, but not all, other Cabinet officers, and the very top - very top -
echelon ofa few White House officials, thatthe appointment of an independent
counsel is the only way to assure public confidence.
I think, as she said - I guess I said it before - that the conflict of personal
loyalty that the Attorney General would face if it were the President seriously
charged with a crime is something that no man should be forced to deal with.
No matter how conscientious he was, he would be wrestling with himself, "Am
I leaning over backwards? Am I going too far in his favor?"
And then I thinkthatthe department does have some institutional conflicts.
I think the Department of Justice, in Watergate, for example, might well have
taken the position thatthe President was not subjectto any judicial process and
was not subject to the subpoena for the tapes, and there was a lot of law that
would support them.
58. The Independent CounselReauthorization Act of 1993: Hearings on S.24 Before the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 11-12 (1993) (testimony of Janet Reno,
Attorney General).
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Equally, theirnormal position is one for defending and expanding executive
privilege.
We were challenging executive privilege.
So there are some real conflicts. So I do think that it is needed, but Iwould
greatly narrow the statute.
And I've got - I'm not sure whether you want them now, but I've got a
list of changes that I -
JUDGE DAVIS: I will let you go ahead, Professor Cox.
PROFESSOR COX: Well, I would first limit it, as I say, to a few senior
high officials beyond the President.
Second, I would, as Judge Walsh said earlier, limit the crimes to abuse
of'official power, including criminal attempts to improperly influence executive,
legislative, and administrative decisions.
Assuming that those two are done, then certain other changes follow along
with them.
I thinkthatthe testthat further investigation is warranted is a little too easy,
that some more stringent strainer is needed, something less than probable cause.
I haven't got just the phrase, but that was suggested.
I was also shaken by what Judge Walsh said.
I would, in such a statute, limit it to a year, unless the judicial panel
extended the time for cause shown, shown in camera, of course.
I have no answer, but I would try to come up with advice as to how far
the investigation might extend to related crimes and crimes related to related
crimes, and so forth.
And I would make itamandatory full-timejob forthe independent counsel.
I think that is symbolic in various ways, that it probably would speed things
up.
JUDGE DAVIS: How do you respond to the suggestion from an earlier
panel that to narrow the class of potential candidates to those willing to work
full time would, in Judge Sentelle's illustration -
PROFESSOR COX: Well, I think that difficulty is much less likely to arise
if you narrow the scope of the statute, by my hypothesis, to cases which, very
close to my definition, involve a national crisis. I can't believe thatthere aren't
qualified people who aren't willing to put aside their normal lives in order to
serve in a position of this responsibility under those circumstances.
JUDGE DAVIS: Ted, as one who would scuttle the statute entirely, what
do you think of Professor Cox's amendments?
MR. OLSON: Well, I agree with many of them.
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My feeling about the independent counsel statute is to starve it from any
oxygen at all, but if you are going to give it some, then make it as little as
possible.
I agree with the notion that the independent counsel should be a full-time
job, particularly. I know that might narrow the scope of people available for
the assignment and make Judge Sentelle and his colleagues'job more difficult,
but we go through a process offinding people to serve in the Justice Department
who agree to a full-time job all the time; we hire U.S. Attorneys. And it may
be, for a short period of time, someone is just going to have to give up what
they do in order to do this sort of thing because if it is not a full-time job, that
means that the independent counsel's priorities are separated; maybe they've
got private clients that are calling upon them. The subject of the independent
counsel investigation wants this dumb thing to be moved ahead and be over
with as quickly as possible and feels that as long as the independent counsel
has divided loyalties with respect to his or her time, that it is a very difficult
situation and that someone should do that full time.
The other changes, if you have invited me to do that, -
JUDGE DAVIS: Go ahead.
MR. OLSON: - is that the idea of these reports is very destructive, it seems
to me, and that if there has to be a report, it should be an extremely narrow
report. The reports as to how money is spent should not be used as a means
by which the independent counsel can indict, through language, the conduct
or character of the persons that were investigated or subjectto the investigation.
One independent counsel came out atthe end of his investigation and said,
"Well, these people shouldn't have been indicted, they didn't commit any crimes,
I shouldn't have even conducted this investigation, but they were stupid and
political in their behavior."
Well, we don't need to appoint a public official to make those types of
pronouncements. There's plenty of people in the press that can do that sort
of thing.
The report that Judge Walsh prepared is full of grand jury material -
selective grand jury material. It may be fair, it may not be fair - and Judge
Walsh, I'm sure, believes thatit is fair-butthe person responding to this report
has no way of knowing whether something has been taken out of context from
several thousand pages of grand jury testimony and used to characterize the
conduct of that individual. There is no way the individual has an opportunity
to respond to that.
That is one of the changes.
I would also-Judge Walsh probablywon't likethis-make the independent
counsel sign a promise, like we do with people in the intelligence community,
that they are not going to write any books about the independent counsel
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experience, and ifthey do, the profits go backto the government because I think
that also provides an opportunity for doing damage to the people who were the
subjects of the investigation and it is not a necessary thing to do.
I've got some other changes, but other people -
JUDGE DAVIS: Well, we will get to Terry in a moment.
Have you got a couple more, -
MR. OLSON: Well, there was some discussion about -
JUDGE DAVIS: - other than printing it in disappearing ink?
MR. OLSON: There was a discussion of the question of attorneys' fees.
Right now, the statute provides that the subject of an independent counsel
investigation can only recover attorneys' fees if they are not indicted, but if
they are indicted, even if they are acquitted, they cannot recover any attorneys'
fees.59
I think that that should be changed because a prosecutor can get an
indictment very easily. It is not difficult to get an indictment when you have
been conducting one of these investigations; and in one instance that I know
of, the threat ofan indictment was used to cause the subject of the investigation
to waive the statute of limitations. The subject knowing that if the indictment
was returned thathe could never recover his attorneys' fees, waived the statute
of limitations and allowed the investigation to go on longer because of that
threat.
You can also not recover attorneys' fees if you are simply a witness.
Many people have to get dragged before these proceedings, spend a
tremendous amount of time involved in the process, and they can't recover their
attorneys' fees.
You can'trecover attorneys' fees forthe period beforeyou were identified
as a subject or for the period after you are no longer identified as a subject.
That seems unfair.
The court, for reasons which I'm sure make sense to the court, cuts back
on the recovery of attorneys' fees in a lot of different aspects of the investigation.
One of the court's rules with respect to this is that to the extent the attorney
has to deal with the press to defend the subject with respect to the allegations
which are being made by the independent counsel, possibly through the press
or in other contexts - to the extent that the lawyer for the subject of the
independent counsel investigation has to deal with the media-and Judge Walsh
agrees that you have to deal with the media at least in some respects when you
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1) (1994) (allowing subject ofindependent counsel investiga-
tion to recover attorneys' fees if independent counsel does not bring indictment against subject).
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are representing someone in this capacity and only the attorney can do it-you
can't recover attorneys' fees for that.
Now, if you are a subject of one of these investigations, your life is on the
line. You ought to be able to find a good lawyer and pay that lawyer according
to what the normal rates are. Otherwise, it is a tremendous disincentive for
lawyers to represent people in these circumstances. As it is, you can't recover
attorneys' fees until the investigation is over, and then it takes a certain period
of time to file the report and recover the fees. So you have suffered a discount
already because of the passage of time.
And I think I have taken too much time.
There are lots of other ways in which the statute could be changed, but
those are the ones that are on my list right now.
JUDGE DAVIS: Terry.
MR. EASTLAND: Well, I guess we could discuss all the many ways in
which the statute could be changed. There are two vehicles that have been
proposed already. Representative Conyers has one reform vehicle, as does
Congressman Dickey from Arkansas. Both parties have therefore representatives
willing to offer ways in which the statute should be reformed. I think, however,
that we would be best to do without the statute entirely; I would not have it.
And I would say that the only reason the statute now is in such bad odor, the
reason that we are having this session here this morning, is because Democrats,
frankly, have experienced it for four years now. There is a certain mutual
assured destruction quality. And so I think that the revisionism that has gone
on in the press and with many Democrats, I would have to say, about the
worthiness of the statute is explained entirely by where people sit now,
notwithstanding that I would say there are plenty of Republicans that are
Democrats with respect to the statute now. They seem far more in love with
it than they did when Ronald Reagan and George Bush were inthe White House.
Let me say this: This is an ancient problem we are dealing with. The
problem is this: What do you do with executive malfeasance? And that is the
essential problem.
It was not unknown to the framers who met in Philadelphia. They pondered
this question. They provided certain means with which to get at executive mal-
feasance. These included, of course, the impeachment mechanism; implicitly,
I would say, congressional investigations as well, which precede, of course,
actual impeachment efforts.
But as well, the Presidenthas the take-care authority, does he not, in Article
11?
60
60. U.S. CONST. art. II § 3.
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Now, it is interesting, with respect to the take-care authority, that the
Constitution does not also tryto eliminate the built-in conflict of interest there,
does it?
The President, yes, has the authority to enforce laws even against himself.
And so for a hundred and - whatever it was - seventy-five years we went
without an independent counsel statute. We did not have such a means oftrying
to deal with this problem of executive malfeasance. We dealt with it through
other means and, yes, there were special prosecutors or outside counsels named
before Professor Cox was named.
President Grant was the first President ever to name an outside counsel.
He also was the first President to fire an outside counsel, not with the same ill
effects, I might say, in 1875. But there have been other examples of outside
counsels being named by Presidents or by Attorneys General. That happened
in the Truman years as well. It happened at the turn of the century in the first
Roosevelt administration.
But all that history be as it may, once we get to Watergate, what, to me,
is interesting about Watergate is that we have the firing of the man to my right
and it is that firing which galvanizes, which energizes, those on Capitol Hill
to find a new means of dealing with this old problem, and all of those early
proposals thought that the problem could be dealt with so long as you could
change the manner in which an outside counsel was to be appointed and so long
as you could change the ability of the President to control, through the removal
power, that outside counsel.
In fact, the early proposals were-Judge Sentelle, you would be interested
in this - to have the judges remove an independent counsel, which I think, if
that case had gone to the Court in Morrison, the Court would have had to have
held that statute unconstitutional.
So there was this search for this mechanism, for this new device, which
many in Congress described as an auxiliary precaution, quoting Federalist 51,61
and they thought that this new device would lead us to a new period in which
all would be well with the country.
Well, if we ever heard of the law of unintended consequences, you know,
so it has been, and so we are having this session here today.
I would just say this: that the Watergate Special Prosecution Force-bear
this in mind - did not endorse the notion of a statutory independent counsel.
It said, "Look, do itthe old-fashioned way: either have Presidents or Attorneys
General name an outside counsel in that particular case to investigate."
Other instrumentalities would be the ones that Bill Barr mentioned this
morning.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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There are other ways in which one can, in extraordinary cases, try to
overcome that conflict of interest, whether real or apparent, but, in any event,
the Attorney General would be responsible, and ultimately the President would
be responsible, consistent, in my judgment, with whatthe Constitution provides.
One other way in which the problem might be approached, other than by
retaining the current statute and revising it in the many, many ways we could
describe - and I would be happy to go into all of those arcane details, but it
seems to me there are more fundamental issues to be brought forward - but
the Office of Special Counsel idea is one that Howard Baker suggested in 1974,
and it is one that Andy Frye and others in Washington have also recommended,
and by this mechanism there would be an office permanently created that would
be located within the Justice Department and it would be headed by someone
nominated by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, perhaps to aten-year
term, such as the FBI Director.
This might be one way oftrying to deal with this particular issue. I think
it, on balance, would probably be abetter means than the one we have now with
the statute because at least you would have an institution in place where
prosecutors could have the ability to compare and contrast cases. In other words,
they wouldn't be focused just simply on the case at hand.
There are also problems with this suggestion as well. Ultimately my view
is that we ought to go back to what we did in Watergate.
JUDGE DAVIS: A number of states have gone that route.
Iwouldbe interested in hearing from the panel members whether they think
any of this is of real concern to the American people. To what extent are the
American people interested or concerned aboutthese issues aswe have discussed
them today?
Congressman Hyde.
CONGRESSMAN HYDE: Well, I think it depends on the press treatment.
Conflict is mother's milk for the media, and if you can develop a conflict,
they can demonize people. They shredded the Nixon Administration, and it
is one of the fascinating aspects of human nature. With all of the negative press
President Clinton has received, his acceptability figures are very, very high.
ButI thinkyou're always going to have conflicts of interest, you're always
going to have perceptions of unfairness and injustice. And I think we have to
have a way to deal with them.
JUDGE DAVIS: Ted, is this a matter of interest to the man on the street,
woman on the street?
MR. OLSON: Well, I think the answer to that is somewhat like Congressman
Hyde said. Most ofthe people onthe streetthinkthatthe idea ofthe independent
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counsel is a good idea because the President can't be trusted to prosecute
himself, but it ought to be of a deeper importance to the American people.
Ifyou look through the listthatwas passed out here ofthe amount ofmoney
and time that has been spent with respect to these various different prosecutions,
and so forth, and now everybody is saying, "Well, we ought to narrow it down
to a narrower group of people and to a narrower list of crimes," and that sort
of thing, most of these people on the list would fall out.
I suspect that ultimately the amount of damage that has been done by this
statute to individuals who have been brought through the process in one way
or another vastly exceeds the benefit; and when we decide that our Constitution
needs to be altered in this way where we are taking the executive power away
from the President and putting it in the hands of someone who is really
uncontrolled through that process and when we are amending the Constitution,
in a sense, through this statute in a way which does not bring about improve-
ments in the system, the American people ought to care about it.
We do have the impeachment process, we do have a free press, and as
Justice Scalia said in his dissenting opinion, the ideathat every single violation
of every single law should be prosecuted sounds like a good idea, but it isn't
the great overriding value that it is perceived to be.62
If we have a mechanism that deals with misconduct by the President or
an Attorney General, which we do in the Constitution, with our free press,
congressional oversight, the office that Terry is talking about creating in the
Department of Justice already exists- it is called the Office of Public Integrity-
there is apermanent part of the Department of Justice that investigates officials,
and they do a pretty darn good job, plus the impeachment process, and so forth.
We have plenty of ways of dealing with official misconduct and we don't need
to keep adding to it.
At some point we are going to have an independent counsel - I think Jake
was worried about this - appointed to investigate the independent counsel. I
mean, there was a risk there because some classified documents were lost in
the course of the Walsh investigation and there may have been an investigation
of that. I guess it didn't turn out to be one.
But we could keep adding different officials to investigate the officials
who we've created to investigate the officials, and so forth, but we had a pretty
good system created in 1787. That is what the people ought to care about. I
think it is ultimately, whether they know it or not, very important to the
American people.
JUDGE DAVIS: Professor Cox.
62. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732-33 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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PROFESSORCOX: Well, I am inclined to think thatthe American people
see the present statute and system as being used as apolitical weapon back and
forth, a political football. They get a certain amount of pleasure out of following
this - at least some of them do- but fundamentally, they have come to distrust-
the proceedings and to think that it doesn't serve the purpose which I think,
in a fundamental sense, they feel is needed, going farther back to Watergate.
JUDGE DAVIS: Terry.
MILEASTLAND: Well, as awriter of books, what I don't like is, the public
does not buy political or governmental or public policy books anymore.
I mean, why do Americans hate politics in government? I have a self-
interest in this. I think the independent counsel statute is but one of the many
reasons. What does the public think about the independent counsel statute?
Yes, I would agree with what Professor Cox said. I think they see it as
something that is used to gain perhaps partisan advantage in Washington. I
think it is important, though, to understand something.
We made a fundamental decision, after Watergate, in the run up to the
enactment of the statute in '78, and the decision was this: that the pursuit of
executive branch criminality should have a much higher priority in our politics
than it has had before - that is a fundamental assumption - and, therefore, we
needed an independent place in a governmentthattheretofore consisted of three
separated powers - we needed an independent place in which to be able to
investigate, to pursue, executive branch criminality, and we have been pursuing
that to a fare-thee-well now over many investigations over the years. This
absorbs ever more time, notjust the lawyers who can bill, not just the defense
attorneys and the others who are engaged in partisan roles on the outside, but
it takes an enormous amount of time.
We have twenty-four hours in a day still, do we not?
And so there is less time to devote to ordinary politics, and this is a point
that cuts across parties, whether itbe Republicans orDemocrats, whoevermight
be in the White House.
Bill Clinton has complained about the investigations of independent
counsels, and so on and so forth; itis not allowing him to perhaps spend as much
time as he might governing. He is making a fair point, I think.
This, of course, is the consequence of the independent counsel statute.
I would also add this. I thinkthe statute may work a disproportionate effect
upon a Democrat in the White House than it does upon a Republican if the
Democrat is ftrying to govern inthe progressive tradition of expanding the central
government because it only tends to weaken presidencies; whereas a Republican
president who, perhaps, is not as interested in expanding the central govern-
ment- it may not have as much of an adverse impact. So there is a certain irony
in the way the statute works in terms of how it can enervate an executive.
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Finally, I would just add this, speaking of Bill Clinton, and we ought to
mention Bob Woodward at some point, I suppose. Bob Woodward's paperback
edition just came out recently - The Choice - and he has an afterword.63 That
book was written during the election season, as you know. He writes very fast.
And the afterword-and I suppose there was some deep-throat in the room which
gave him this information-but he paints a scene, over a couple of pages, where
Bob Dole and Bill Clinton have this post-election meeting. To paraphrase the
conversation, Bill Clinton says to Bob Dole, "Bob, you know, you were right
and I was wrong. You were right about the independent counsel law that you
had opposed for so many years and I was wrong."' The wisdom of four years
later.
Now, in 1992, when Bill Clinton and Al Gore were running, there was,
of course, from Al Gore the demand that Bill Barr, whom we've heard from
'earlier, seek the appointment of an independent counsel in the Iraqgate matter.
That was then; this is now.
I think the political coordinates have sufficiently changed that it is quite
possible that in 1999-this would be my advice to Henry down there-my advice
to you would be, don't pass the statute. The statute cannot be enacted by the
President of the United States alone. We still have to go through two houses
of Congress, do we not? And I think that President Clinton might be agreeable
to not having the statute in the future.
JUDGE DAVIS: I will treat that as Terry's final statement.
Professor Cox, I extend to you ninety seconds to make a final statement
and give final advice to Congressman Hyde.
PROFESSOR COX: I willjust make one remark first, ifI may, about what
Terry was last saying, -
JUDGE DAVIS: Yes, sir.
PROFESSOR COX: - and that is, I think what faults he finds, this public
response that he describes, the amount of time given to charges and defense
of the executive wrongdoing, is a result of the present statute and its breadth,
and that those saying if it were narrowed as drastically as I suggest, that it would
be something there for the rare crisis and not something that was used all the
time.
The last point I would add - I do say this very general - I do think it
importantthat everything possible be done-you can'tjust legislate it-to wipe
out the picture which has been growing that the job of independent counsel,
as it's created by this statute- and I am not directing this to independent counsel
63. BOB WOODWARD, ThECHOIcE (1996).
64. See id. at 444.
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so much as others - has come to be seen as a hunt and it's a failure unless the
hunt gets the game.
Surely, the right position, particularly if the statute is narrowed as I said,
is that it is really an impartial inquiry.
President Nixon would never believe that I saw it that way. I think I saw
it that way, truly, and that there would have been more advantages in finding
that there was no criminal wrongdoing by our President rather than finding that
therewas. And I think thejob should be seen as a success whether independent
counsel, in this narrow range of cases, finds that there is ground for seeking
an indictment or whether he concludes that an indictment should not be sought.
And therefore, so far as the administration of criminal justice is concerned, the
President or the one or two other high officials are entitled to,just like any other
individual in this country, the presumption of innocence of any criminal
wrongdoing and that is the end, or should be the end, of counsel's responsibility.
And while I think he needs to report on that much, he shouldn't be reporting
a lot of other comments that don't lie in the area of criminal law.
JUDGE DAVIS: Ted, final say.
MR. OLSON: The only thing that I would add is that Justice Scalia again
foresaw a lot of this,65 and one of the things that he said was- and I'm reminded
by what Terry said about President Clinton now agreeing that this independent
counsel statute is a bad idea - when Attorney General William French Smith
took office in 1981, when the Reagan administration began, former Attorney
General Griffin Bell came to him and said, "The one thing that you are really
going to hate is that independent counsel statute." He said, "It's the worstthing
that we did. We shouldn't have done it," referring to the Carter administration.
So this pendulum swings back and forth and people are now coming around
to recognizing these things. But Justice Scalia foresaw the political difficulty
with it, the same political difficulty that the Clinton administration had when
they allowed the statute to come back after Bill Barr and the Bush administration
had allowed it to die.
Justice Scalia said:
[I~t is difficult to vote not to enact, and even more difficult to vote to repeal,
a statute called ... the Ethics in Government Act. If Congress is controlled
by the party other than the one to which the President belongs, it has little
incentive to repeal it; if it is controlled by the same party, it dare not. By
its shortsighted action today, I fear the Court has permanently encumbered
the Republic with an institution that will do it great harm.'
65. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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JUDGE DAVIS: Congressman Hyde, you are going to get the last word.
I have been prevailed upon by Terry to give him a few more seconds.
MR. EASTLAND: Ijust want to make a final comment, which is this, Ted.
The statute does grandfather in existing independent counsel. Sothose already
at work right now would continue after June 30, 1999.
Now, the Republicans might think that is the best of all possible worlds -
keep those current counsels going and not take the gamble that perhaps they
can recover the White House in 2000.
The political circumstances, I think, have changed. This will be the first
ever circumstance in which the Republicans, if they are reelected and they can
control Congress in '98, would have that option.
But the final comment I wanted to make was simply this. There is an
important paradox at the heart of the independent counsel statute. The statute
presumes the prosecution of a sitting President of the United States.
Now, I ask you this - this is a roomful ofjudges - is that constitutional?
That's an interesting question.
And it is not a question the Supreme Court has rendered an opinion on,
as we know. It was, by the way, rolled into the Nixon privilege case. The Court
took cert. on that question and then decided not to render an opinion on it. But
it is a very interesting question, of course, in constitutional law, and I would
say the policy at the Justice Department is that a sitting President may not be
prosecuted.
That is what Robert Bork wrote in 1973. In litigation in 1973 regarding
Spiro Agnew, he had occasion to treat that question.
And the government's amicus in the Paula Jones case, the Solicitor
General's brief in that case,6' has a footnote in which it alludes to the learning
at the Justice Department on this question.
And so I think that the position of the United States still today remains
that. So here is an interesting question: Can an independent counsel, charged
with investigating a President, violate the Department of Justice policy by
indicting a sitting President?
JUDGE DAVIS: Congressman Hyde.
CONGRESSMAN HYDE: I can't predict what is going to happen in the
coming year, but my guess would be that we will reauthorize an independ-
ent counsel statute. I think we will learn a lot from the experience we have
had in the past years and from the information provided by you gentlemen and
ladies.
67. Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15 .n.8,
Clinton v. Jones, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (1996) (No. 95-1853).
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It should be of some limited duration, with permission to extend it for good
cause shown, a narrower charter, accountability in terms of funding, but not
cross the line to where we use that as a device to impair the independence.
The fact is, human nature is human nature.
I wouldn'thave trusted Ed Meese to prosecute Ronald Reagan and I don't
trust Janet Reno to prosecute Bill Clinton.
Now, I am not saying they should be prosecuted. I am simply illustrating
the inherent conflict of interest with a prosecutor who is a political appointee
trying to prosecute or investigate her patron or his patron. It's not going to
happen. So you need this institution. You need to have public confidence that
people are being treated justly and fairly, but we ought to try to make it as
workable an institution as we can.
This meeting has been a great contribution, and I am going to talk to Ted
again and again. I know how he feels and his ideas are good. So are yours,
Terry, and Mr. Cox -just fine - and this has been very useful.
Thank you.
JUDGE DAVIS: Please thank each panelist.
(Applause.)
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